Israeli elections: Netanyahu's failure and the opposition's calculations

Writer: Mustafa Ibrahim

As the Israeli elections, scheduled for October 27, approach, the competition is entering its final two weeks amid a clear paradox: Gadi Eisenkot is ahead of Benjamin Netanyahu in some opinion polls regarding suitability to head the government, but this progress is not necessarily reflected in an increase in the opposition camp’s seats or its ability to form an alternative government.

Eisenkot's invitation to a live television debate with Netanyahu has a significance that goes beyond the confrontation between them. It is part of the competition for the leadership of the opposition, and an attempt to present Eisenkot as the alternative most capable of confronting the Prime Minister and attracting votes from the parties of the same camp, and not just from the right.

Since the attack of October 7, 2023, the failure of the security and political services to prevent the attack and confront its repercussions has remained one of the most prominent challenges facing Netanyahu. However, he is trying to keep the competition tied to security, regional threats, and the outcome of war, rather than turning the election into a referendum on his political responsibility.

On the other hand, the opposition links the failures of October 7 to the need to change leadership, and demands the formation of an official investigation committee to hold those responsible accountable and draw lessons. But holding Netanyahu responsible does not automatically mean that votes will go to his opponents. Hesitant voters need to be convinced that the opposition is capable of offering a different security and political alternative.

Eisenkot is trying to use his military background and security experience to present himself as a candidate who combines accountability and efficient governance. However, the challenge before him goes beyond criticizing Netanyahu to clarifying what the next government will do differently, and how it will deal with the repercussions of the war, military service, and rebuilding confidence in institutions.

The opposition parties are not moving within a unified program, despite their agreement on the necessity of ending Netanyahu's rule. Eisenkot focuses on security, governance efficiency, and rebuilding institutions, while Naftali Bennett seeks to attract voters from the right who do not want Netanyahu to continue, without moving to the left camp. Avigdor Lieberman attaches special importance to Haredi recruitment and distribution of burdens, while Yair Golan focuses on accountability and protecting democratic institutions.

These differences make the competition for opposition leadership part of the electoral battle. Each party seeks to expand its share of the vote, but the competition may turn into a struggle for seats within the same camp, without increasing its total number of seats.

The issue of Haredi recruitment emerges here, which goes beyond the needs of the army to the issue of equality in bearing burdens, the relationship between religious parties and the state, and the ability of any future government to impose new arrangements. The opposition is trying to invest it in addressing reserve soldiers, their families, and voters who believe that the continuation of broad exemptions is not commensurate with the military burdens borne by other sectors of Israeli society.

As for the high cost of living, it represents a daily challenge for Israelis, and several parties, including the parties of Eisenkot and Bennett, present it among their economic priorities. But the presence of this issue in programs does not necessarily mean that it will turn into electoral votes. In light of the polarization around Netanyahu and security, its influence in electoral discourse may decline, despite its continued presence in daily life.

The opposition thus faces a double dilemma: it wants to make the elections a referendum on Netanyahu’s performance and responsibility, but it also needs to convince voters that it has a program that goes beyond changing the prime minister, and includes the economy, public services, military service, and management of state institutions.

The small parties fluctuating over the electoral threshold gain special importance in the last two weeks, because their entry into the Knesset or their failure to do so may affect the distribution of seats between the camps. In this context, Eisenkot's accounts regarding the Reserve Soldiers' Party led by Yoaz Hendel and Yeron Zelekha, as well as Ofer Winter's party, stand out. According to internal polls, the failure of the two lists to exceed the electoral threshold gives Eisenkot's camp the largest number of seats compared to scenarios in which one or both of them enter the Knesset.

These calculations explain Eisenkot's attempt to cast doubt on the chances of some small parties and push for tactical voting to reduce the dispersion of votes within the opposition. But this strategy carries risks; The votes of a small party may transfer to a competing party within the same camp, without increasing the overall strength of the opposition.

Also, the entry of a small party into the Knesset does not automatically mean it joins a specific camp. The criterion is not the number of seats alone, but the extent to which they can be converted into a parliamentary majority capable of forming a government. Therefore, Eisenkot's moves should be read as part of the struggle over the distribution of votes within the opposition, and not as evidence of ensuring the formation of an alternative government.

Polls in recent days show that the race is still open, and that both camps are having difficulty ensuring a stable majority. Eisenkot's lead over Netanyahu on the question of suitability to head the government does not eliminate the difference between a candidate topping the polls and his camp having the necessary seats to form the government. On the other hand, Netanyahu is taking advantage of the continuing disagreements within the opposition, and is trying to present himself as the indispensable option in a turbulent period, while keeping security and regional threats at the forefront of his campaign.

In light of this, the responsibility for the failures of October 7, security, the economy, Haredi recruitment, and the calculations of coalition formation are intertwined in the elections. The challenge for Eisenkot will be to convert his personal lead into additional seats, and to expand his support base beyond voters who are already opposed to Netanyahu.

Therefore, the question in the last two weeks is not limited to whether Netanyahu will lose power, but rather whether the opposition will be able to transform his failures into a parliamentary majority, and whether the change in leadership will be accompanied by a change in policies, or whether he will remain confined to the management of the occupying state and the disputes within Israeli society.