Palestinians cannot govern themselves!

Is postponing the elections in the interest of Palestine or does it leave its political decision in the hands of others?

Bethlehem - Ofoq News - Special Investigation - In April 2025, while wars were redrawing the political balances in the Middle East and Europe, a group of advisors associated with a number of Western countries, from Europe, Canada and Australia, met in London to discuss international issues and provide political estimates regarding the future of the region after the Russian-Ukrainian war, the war in Gaza, the confrontation between Israel and Hezbollah, the economic war between China and America, and Trump’s decisions related to customs duties and the possibility of war with Iran.

According to a testimony given by one of the participants to Ofoq News Agency, which kept his identity, the issue of the future of Palestinian governance was raised during the discussions, and the assessment conveyed by the source was shocking: “The Palestinian people cannot govern themselves; half of them are corrupt, meaning the Palestinian Authority, and the other half are terrorist, meaning the Hamas movement.”

According to the source's account, this assessment led to the idea of ​​subjecting the Palestinians to some form of external administration or supervision.

To what extent have the countries that participated adopted this recommendation, and is there a unified Western decision to impose guardianship over the Palestinians? Let us open the door to examine what happened next: Did international politics actually move towards managing the Palestinians instead of enabling them to govern themselves?

Months later, US President Donald Trump announced his plan for Gaza, and then the Peace Council was established under his leadership to oversee the transitional arrangements for the Strip. In a parallel diplomatic track, France and Saudi Arabia led an initiative to recognize the Palestinian state, accompanied by demands to reform the institutions of the Authority and renew its legitimacy.

Between the two tracks, the Palestinians had a rare opportunity: to transform international recognition of the state into popular legitimacy derived from the ballot box, and to use the elections to politically reconnect Jerusalem, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, after years of division, war, and the disruption of institutions.

However, on October 10, 2026, President Mahmoud Abbas issued a decree that canceled the legislative elections scheduled for November 28, and set September 11, 2027, as a new date for holding both presidential and legislative elections.

The presidency justified its decision by the Israeli obstacles and the deterioration of the security, political and economic conditions, stressing that it came after consultations with the Palestinian factions and forces.

Here the question becomes bigger than just postponing the vote for eleven months: Who benefited from the postponement decision? Did the decision protect the Palestinians’ right to free and comprehensive elections, or did it give local and external powers more time to manage the Palestinian issue without a new electoral mandate from its owners?

From the London discussions to the international supervision system for Gaza

Fears of turning the Palestinians into a people managed from outside are no longer merely theoretical political assessments.

On September 29, 2025, Trump announced his plan to end the Gaza war. On November 17 of the same year, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2803, which welcomed the establishment of the (Peace Council) as a transitional administration with international legal personality, responsible for setting the general framework for the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip and coordinating its financing.

The decision stipulated that the management of daily services would be in the hands of a Palestinian committee of technocrats, working under international supervision and control, until the Palestinian Authority completed the reform program and was able to regain control of the Strip in a safe and effective manner.

In January 2026, these arrangements transformed into an institutional structure, with the formation of the Peace Council and the adoption of its charter, headed by Trump.

This does not legally mean that Gaza has returned to the old colonial mandate system. But there is a reality that cannot be ignored: the authority to determine the form of the transitional administration, financing mechanisms, and basic aspects of future governance in Gaza has become linked to an international body that does not derive its legitimacy from direct Palestinian elections.

Indeed, the Peace Council report submitted to the Security Council in May 2026 spoke about a Palestinian technocratic committee, headed by Ali Shaath, and about a senior international representative for Gaza, Nikolai Mladenov, and about security, administrative, and economic arrangements related to the implementation of the plan.

Launch of the institutional framework for the Peace Council in Davos, January 2026

This fact becomes even more important when reading what happened during the first year of the plan’s implementation. According to a Washington Post report published on October 8, 2026, reconstruction and administrative transition projects faced Israeli obstacles, despite the presence of funds and projects prepared in advance. Reuters also reported the continued Israeli occupation of large areas of the Gaza Strip, and the faltering arrangements for disarmament, withdrawal and reconstruction.

In other words, the broad American influence on the transitional arrangements does not mean that Washington can implement all its decisions without Israel. But it makes clear that the Palestinians themselves do not have full control over the decision regarding the future of Gaza.

The United Arab Emirates appears among the countries involved in the regional movements related to Gaza, and its relationship with Muhammad Dahlan and the Democratic Reform Movement constitutes an important part of the Palestinian scene.

An intermediary source reported that Israel informed him of conveying a message to Dahlan, rejecting his alliance with Hamas. However, the possibility of electoral rapprochement between Dahlan’s movement and Hamas is not an unfounded assumption; The Associated Press reported, before the postponement decision, that talks were taking place regarding a possible electoral alliance that included Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Dahlan’s movement, and that this development further complicated the electoral scene.

Here, the role of the UAE emerged in translating Dahlan’s position that bringing Hamas into the framework of power is better than leaving it outside the political system, thus becoming undisciplined forces closer to ISIS.

The question arises: If these forces are indeed looking for an electoral partnership, why does rapprochement lead to further postponement instead of testing its true magnitude in the elections?

France and Saudi Arabia.. Has recognition of the state become conditional on reforming the authority?

French President Emmanuel Macron at the United Nations during the announcement of French recognition of the Palestinian state, September 2025.

While the United States was moving towards formulating a framework for the transitional administration of Gaza, France and Saudi Arabia led a different international path entitled recognition of the Palestinian state and reviving the two-state solution.

The two countries held an international conference in New York between July 28 and 30, 2025, and then the United Nations General Assembly adopted the New York Declaration on September 12 by a majority of 142 countries.

On September 22, 2025, French President Emmanuel Macron announced his country’s recognition of the State of Palestine. However, recognition was not separate from the future of the Palestinian political system.

In Paragraph 22 of the New York Declaration, countries welcomed President Mahmoud Abbas’s pledge to hold general and presidential elections, in all the occupied Palestinian territories, including East Jerusalem, within one year, and under international auspices.

The political framework also stipulated a competition between Palestinian parties that respect the political program of the PLO, its international obligations, United Nations resolutions, and the principle of the unity of the state, government, law, and weapons.

As for Paragraph 21, it focused on reforming the Palestinian Authority and enhancing transparency, governance, and financial sustainability.

Therefore, the talk about elections was not a diplomatic detail, but rather part of an international vision for a renewed Palestinian authority that can demand national political representation before the world.

Macron confirmed this link in his speech to the United Nations when he said that Abbas pledged to reform Palestinian governance, and that France would monitor the implementation of the commitments made to it.

Here a striking paradox appears: France supported recognition of the State of Palestine, but linked the success of the political track to rebuilt Palestinian institutions. Can these institutions obtain real legitimacy if the elections continue to be postponed?

Why was France angry?

The answer lies in the official statement issued by the French Foreign Ministry on October 11, 2026.

Paris did not use neutral diplomatic language, but rather declared its regret for the postponement, and considered that it once again deprived the Palestinians of the democratic expression of their will.

It called on the Palestinian authorities to reconsider the decision and hold presidential and legislative elections as soon as possible.

What is most significant is that it linked continued support for building Palestinian state institutions to the implementation of the commitments made in the context of recognition.

This does not prove that France has legal guardianship over the Authority, but it confirms that it possesses important political and diplomatic pressure tools, and that renewing electoral legitimacy has become one of the criteria by which Paris measures the Palestinian leadership’s commitment to its promises.

Therefore, the French dispute with the authority does not appear to be a technical dispute over the date of the vote. Rather, it is related to the credibility of the political project that Paris promoted before the international community.

1.6 billion euros... support for the Palestinians or a means of pressure on the authority?

On 14 April 2025, the European Commission announced a multi-year support program worth up to €1.6 billion for the period 2025–2027.

The program aims to enhance the Palestinians' ability to withstand and support Palestinian services, institutions and the economy, within a partnership linked to the reform program presented by the Authority.

But this amount does not represent a blank check worth 1.6 billion euros that can be completely transferred to the authority’s treasury.

According to the European Commission, the program includes about 620 million euros in direct budget aid, and support for services, refugees and recovery projects, in addition to financing that could reach 400 million euros in the form of loans from the European Investment Bank to the private sector, subject to additional approvals.

The program also includes a mechanism to follow up on the implementation of the authority’s reforms and enhance transparency before donors. These details are important because they define the nature of European influence.

The European Union is not just an external financier, but rather an influential partner in reforming the Palestinian administration, its institutions, and its financial capacity. But he also does not have the legal authority to appoint the Palestinian leadership or choose the people’s representatives in his place.

The danger begins when foreign aid and reforms become a substitute for internal popular accountability.

An authority that submits achievement reports to donors, but does not face voters, may succeed in fulfilling the funding conditions without addressing the crisis of confidence between it and Palestinian society.

Hence, the question becomes legitimate: To whom does the Palestinian institution submit its statement of account first? To the citizen who is supposed to grant it the mandate, or to the donor who provides it with the resources?

Hussein Al-Sheikh's message to Paris... Was it an attempt to contain a diplomatic crisis?

One day before the postponement decree was issued, specifically on October 9, 2026, Reuters published details of a letter sent by Palestinian Vice President Hussein Al-Sheikh to French Foreign Minister Jean-Noel Barrot.

The letter, according to what the agency reported, spoke about the deteriorating political, security and economic conditions, and the difficulty of ensuring comprehensive, free and fair elections, in light of the Israeli restrictions, the Palestinian division, and the continuing crises in Gaza and the West Bank.

She also indicated that developments related to Trump's initiative and international resolutions did not bring about the hoped-for improvement in the conditions necessary for the electoral process.

The timing of the message is very significant. Paris had made the elections one of the main commitments accompanying the recognition of the Palestinian state, and then, before the official announcement, it received a letter explaining why the elections would not be carried out on time.

The letter may be read as a diplomatic attempt to convince France of the justifications for postponement or mitigate its repercussions. But to be certain that it was sent exclusively to absorb expected French anger requires reviewing the complete correspondence and communications that preceded it.

The result that we know now is that the letter did not prevent a public French objection the day after the decree.

Here another question arises: If the Palestinian leadership expected France to object, and knew the importance of the elections for the state recognition project, what gains did it see as being worth bearing this diplomatic loss?

Israel, Gaza and Jerusalem: real obstacles or sufficient justifications for postponement?

It is not possible to conduct a serious investigation into the Palestinian elections without acknowledging the existence of real obstacles imposed by Israel.

Israel controls the crossings and the movement of people and goods in large areas, and imposes restrictions on Palestinian political activity in East Jerusalem, while Gaza suffers from widespread destruction, the collapse of large parts of the infrastructure, and continued security tension.

Reports from Reuters and Associated Press have pointed to these obstacles, and to the difficulties facing the work of the Election Commission, candidates, and observers.

But acknowledging the existence of obstacles alone does not answer the most important question: Does their presence necessitate postponing elections in all Palestinian territories, or could alternative mechanisms be developed that preserve political entitlement?

There is a difference between Israel imposing restrictions on the elections, and Israeli rejection turning into a practical right to determine the date of the Palestinian vote.

If sharing Jerusalem is a national condition that cannot be waived, a distinction must be made between giving up the Palestinian right to Jerusalem and amending the technical means to exercise this right.

If the conditions in Gaza do not allow for traditional elections, the question that should have been directed to the Elections Commission, the government, and the factions is: What alternatives were studied? What specifically could not be implemented? Are there plans to register or vote in alternative centers or through special arrangements for displaced people, without compromising the confidentiality and integrity of the vote?

As for saying that the American administration, through unannounced channels, rejected the elections in Gaza as it bears responsibility for the transitional arrangements, there is not enough to prove. The same applies to the story regarding an official Israeli verbal notification of rejection of the elections in Jerusalem and Gaza. Despite talk from more than one source about this

But international texts provide further evidence of the scale of the problem

Security Council Resolution 2803 makes the Gaza Transitional Administration linked to the Peace Council, and places the Palestinian Authority’s restoration of its responsibilities within a specific reform and security path. On the other hand, the New York Declaration stipulates elections that include all Palestinian territories, including East Jerusalem.

Thus, the Palestinians are faced with two international paths that intersect without coinciding: a path to administer Gaza during the transitional phase, and a path to renew the institutions of the Palestinian state through elections.

The elections could have tested the possibility of connecting the two tracks within the framework of one Palestinian representation, instead of continuing the separation between the administration of Gaza and the authority in the West Bank.

But it must also be recognized that electing a unified legislative council does not automatically lead to ending the division or transferring actual executive authority in Gaza. This requires binding agreements on government, security, finance, and the judiciary, and the acceptance of the election results by the parties controlling the ground.

Did the Palestinians have a historic opportunity to unify political representation?

One of the most important opportunities that the elections could have provided was to restore Jerusalem, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to their status as a single political entity, even if field conditions prevented the exercise of unified governmental authority over all of its territories.

The land may be divided by barriers, occupation, and military borders, but a parliament elected according to a single national district can, in principle, give the population common representation.

The Palestinian electoral amendments have actually tended to enhance proportional representation and reduce the electoral threshold to 1%.

It is important here to clarify a legal development: in June 2026 an amendment was issued raising the number of seats in the Legislative Council to 200, but a later amendment in August returned the number to 132 seats, while maintaining the 1% discount rate and other provisions related to the representation of women and the conditions for candidacy. This was confirmed by the Central Election Commission on August 12.

This change had an important political meaning, because it allowed relatively small forces to compete for representation, and reduced the possibility of monopolizing council seats between only two movements.

What about the Palestinians in the diaspora?

Here a distinction should be made between the Palestinian Legislative Council and the Palestinian National Council. The legislature relates to the representation of citizens in accordance with its electoral law, and simply holding a Palestinian identity does not mean the ability to vote or run for office from anywhere without fulfilling the conditions of the law.

As for the Palestinian National Council, on June 4, 2026, President Abbas approved an electoral system that makes its total members 350, including 200 representatives of the Palestinian territories and 150 representatives of Palestinians abroad and the diaspora, with the adoption of full proportional representation where elections are held.

A previous decree set November 1, 2026 as the date for the National Council elections, wherever possible.

This distinction is important because the greatest opportunity was not only the election of a new legislative council, but rather the rebuilding of Palestinian national representation at two levels: the institutions of governance in the homeland, and the Liberation Organization, which represents the Palestinians wherever they are.

If these political processes coincided within an agreed upon national programme, it would be possible to reduce the gap between the Palestinians in the occupied territories and the diaspora, without claiming that electing the legislative council alone represents all Palestinians in the world.

Was half a million voters enough to create Palestinian legitimacy?

This case raises a question that goes beyond the number of participants to the political and statistical value of voting.

According to the opinion of an expert in surveys and opinion polls who spoke to (Ofoq News), the participation of about half a million voters in elections based on proportional representation can provide a very accurate indicator of voting trends.

It is necessary here to distinguish between statistical calculation and electoral legitimacy.

If we assume, theoretically, that a simple random sample of 500,000 people is selected from a large electoral community, the approximate margin of error for a percentage of 50% would be about 0.14 percentage points at a 95% confidence level.

But elections are not a random sample poll. Voters decide to participate or boycott themselves, and participation may be affected by age, region, political affiliation, and ability to reach polling stations.

Therefore, it cannot be said that the participation of half a million voters guarantees a margin of error of less than 1% in representing the will of the entire Palestinian people.

However, elections do not derive their legitimacy exclusively from the participation rate, but rather from their legality, freedom of participation, equal opportunities, possibility of competition, confidentiality of voting, integrity of vote counting, and acceptance of results.

On the other hand, voluntarily boycotting some voters is completely different from forcibly depriving them of voting due to siege, displacement, or military restrictions.

Here a real political dilemma arises: Is it better to have elections in which a large portion of citizens participate, with others unable to participate, or to continue institutions without elections until everyone’s participation becomes possible?

There is no easy or automatic answer. But postponing elections should be the exception based on a proven necessity and a clear plan, not the rule through which existing institutions renew themselves.

Was Fatah really a candidate to win?

One of the most important hypotheses that should be tested is that the Fatah movement was not in danger of inevitable defeat, and that postponing the elections may have deprived it of a political opportunity that was better than some decision-makers imagined.

There is data that supports some of this hypothesis, but not all of it.

In September 2026, the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research published an analysis based on a poll it conducted in August, which showed that Fatah obtained 32% of the votes of likely voters, compared to 29% for Hamas and 18% for the other forces, with 21% of the undecided, in a test scenario for traditional lists.

The analysis indicated a decline in Hamas from the levels of support it recorded at a previous stage, but it also warned of the impact of Fatah divisions and opposition alliances on the distribution of seats.

Poll by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research; Percentages of the traditional list scenario, not election results.

These numbers do not automatically mean that Fatah won, but they refute the assumption that the movement was doomed to defeat.

Indeed, elections with a proportional representation system, the presence of independent and small lists, and the decline in confidence in traditional forces might have opened the way for a diverse legislative council that needed alliances to form a majority.

This may have been better for the Palestinian political system than the continuation of an executive authority lacking elected parliamentary oversight.

Was Hamas able to run in equal elections?

Hamas in Gaza faces exceptional situations, including the military repercussions of the war, organizational losses, security restrictions, and the risks of overt political action.

It can be assumed that these circumstances make forming lists and running electoral campaigns more difficult than what other forces face in the West Bank.

But it is not possible to be certain that the movement will not find candidates or that it will lose simply because of these circumstances, especially since proportional representation and electoral alliances may allow it to compete in other forms.

Moreover, elections held under the fear of candidates being targeted or arrested cannot be described as completely equal.

Therefore, two conflicting hypotheses must be tested: the first is that Hamas would have lost part of its electoral power due to the results of the war and the decline in support; The second is that security restrictions may make competition unfair for some forces, affecting the credibility of the results.

The aforementioned poll supports the hypothesis of a decline in Hamas's popularity, but it does not prove its inability to compete or determine the results of the vote in advance.

Who benefits from postponing the elections?

The answer here cannot depend on the slogans of supporters and opponents, but rather on an analysis of actual interests.

This table represents an analysis of interests and incentives, and is not evidence of secret coordination between the parties.

The first beneficiary: the continuation of the status quo

From an institutional standpoint, the clearest direct gain from postponement goes to the parties that retain their positions and powers without facing a new electoral test.

This is not necessarily the interest of the Fatah movement as a political organization, nor even the interest of President Abbas in the long term, but it may serve the survival of officials and centers of influence within the existing political and administrative system.

An official who gains his position through an appointment or administrative decision may see the emergence of an elected legislative council as a threat to his institution’s ability to make decisions without accountability.

But turning this possibility into an accusation that specific officials postponed the elections to protect personal interests requires additional evidence, such as minutes of meetings, direct testimonies from participants in the decision, or documents proving a conflict of interest.

However, the institutional outcome does not need to prove private motivations: postponement keeps the existing political structure longer without electoral renewal.

The second beneficiary: Israel, in terms of the political outcome

There is no documented evidence before us that Israel issued an order to the Palestinian leadership to postpone the elections or that it coordinated this decision with it.

However, it can be said that the continued absence of an elected legislative institution that brings together the Palestinians, and the continued political and administrative separation between Gaza and the West Bank, are consistent with the goal of weakening the Palestinian ability to engage in unified political action.

At this point, the result should not be confused with intention: Israel may benefit from the continuation of the division, but this does not mean that it took the decision to postpone on behalf of the Palestinians.

The most pressing question is why should Israeli restrictions disrupt a comprehensive Palestinian political right, rather than holding Israel accountable to international institutions and seeking alternative arrangements?

The third beneficiary: the Palestinian forces that need additional time

The interest is not limited to postponement within the authority. Hamas, for example, showed acceptance of postponement in the context of demanding a comprehensive national dialogue. Reports that preceded the decree also spoke of negotiations between Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Dahlan’s movement regarding possible electoral arrangements and alliances.

It is possible that multiple powers will see that an additional year will help them rebuild their structures, modify their alliances, and complete the conditions for competition.

But what may be beneficial to these forces organizationally is not necessarily beneficial to the Palestinian people politically.

Political forces can negotiate their future, while citizens remain without a direct electoral means to hold them accountable.

Are there two guardianships over Palestine?

When the data are collected, two different pictures of external influence emerge.

The first is American, related to the transitional administration, reconstruction and security arrangements of Gaza, and it obtained an international legal basis through Security Council Resolution 2803.

The second is European-French, related to supporting the institutions of the Palestinian Authority and its reform program and renewing its legitimacy, in the context of recognition of the Palestinian state and the two-state solution path.

Saudi Arabia interferes with the second track through its partnership with France in the New York conference, and the French-Saudi initiative was explicitly mentioned among the terms of reference associated with the PA reform program in the Security Council resolution on Gaza.

This is a very important point: the two paths are not completely separate; Indeed, the Security Council resolution itself links the future administration of Gaza to reforming the Authority, and refers to the French-Saudi initiative.

But describing the French path as official guardianship of the Palestinian Authority goes beyond the available evidence. France does not have the legal authority to manage the institutions of power or appoint its leadership, even though it exercises important diplomatic and political influence.

As for the Peace Council, it has actual transitional powers determined by the international resolution on Gaza.

Thus, the issue is not the existence of two forces sharing Palestine with a proven agreement, but rather the existence of two systems of influence and external supervision, at a time when the Palestinians have not succeeded in renewing the institutions of their national representation.

The danger is that postponement will become a factor that prolongs this reality: the less the ability of Palestinian institutions to provide a modern popular mandate, the more influential international parties will become in determining the conditions for their reform and their roles.

What could President Abbas have done?

From a political perspective, President Mahmoud Abbas had another option, albeit one that was not guaranteed to succeed.

He could have adhered to the elections as a sovereign right of the Palestinian people, and declared that Israel's refusal to organize voting in Jerusalem, or to disrupt the procedures in Gaza, would not turn into a right to cancel the Palestinian democratic process.

He could also have called on France, the European Union, the United Nations, and the countries that recognized Palestine to treat the elections as a practical test of the seriousness of recognition of the state and the right of its people to choose their representatives.

If it is not possible to participate in part of the lands, alternatives should be presented to the Central Elections Commission, political forces, and legal bodies, specifying what the laws allow and what requires amendment or special arrangements.

However, if the Election Commission proved that conducting free and comprehensive voting had become impossible, a detailed professional evaluation could have been published specifying the reasons for the impossibility, the parties that disrupted the vote, the alternatives that were tested, and the conditions for returning to the elections.

In this way, the postponement is not just a top-down political decision, but an outcome whose necessity can be examined by the public and the international community.

International recognition of the Palestinian state was an important opportunity, but it was not a substitute for the legitimacy of its institutions. Holding elections, even amid difficult circumstances, could have given the Palestinian leadership a new political mandate that would be difficult to ignore.

If the elections did not lead to an immediate end to the occupation or division, they were at least able to determine who has the right to negotiate on behalf of citizens, who has the right to hold the government accountable, and who represents political diversity within Palestinian society.

This would have made the Palestinians an elected party in deciding their future, not just a subject for negotiations taking place about their future.

Judging the decision: Was the postponement necessary or a political error?

To examine the decision fairly, the arguments for postponement should be pitted against the arguments for holding elections.

Decision balance

The risks of holding elections in Gaza after the war, or in Jerusalem amid Israeli restrictions, or in the West Bank with continued barriers, arrests, and violence cannot be underestimated.

Elections in which lists are prevented from running, or in which candidates are afraid to participate, or in which a large portion of voters are prevented from casting their votes, may produce a council that lacks the legitimacy of representation that the democratic process is supposed to provide.

But on the other hand, postponing it for eleven months does not in itself provide a solution to any of these problems.

Nothing in the decree guarantees that Israel will allow elections in Jerusalem in 2027, or that Gaza will have sufficiently recovered, or that the Peace Council will abandon its transitional arrangements, or that the Palestinian forces will be able to agree on a single governmental authority.

Here the political justification for postponement is weak: if there is no implementable vision to address the obstacles, changing the date does not mean eliminating the causes of the problem.

It may even have moved the crisis itself from November 2026 to September 2027, with an additional loss of trust and legitimacy.

Which palm is more likely?

On the basis of available evidence, the preference is to preserve the electoral entitlement and reconsider the postponement decision, without sacrificing the minimum level of integrity and comprehensiveness.

The almost certain gains from postponement are represented by the continuation of the existing political structure and the provision of additional time for negotiations and preparations, while in addition to its certain losses are the postponement of the renewal of institutions and the continued absence of elected legislative oversight.

As for the justifications related to the improvement of conditions after eleven months, they are still bets on future developments that are not guaranteed.

Therefore, the best option was, and still is, to demand that the Palestinian leadership, the Elections Commission, and the factions prepare a public implementation plan to complete the elections as soon as possible, including addressing the participation of Jerusalem and Gaza, guaranteeing the rights of candidates, international monitoring, and mechanisms for dealing with any Israeli obstruction.

Postponement should only be acceptable if an independent assessment demonstrates that practical alternatives are not feasible without seriously compromising the freedom and integrity of the elections.

Have the Palestinians lost a historic opportunity?

There is a saying that says that whoever wants to destroy himself is too preoccupied with the details. Excessive preoccupation with details may be dangerous when it obscures the bigger picture from decision-makers.

At a historical moment that witnessed new international recognition of the State of Palestine, initiatives to rebuild institutions, and unprecedented interest in the future of governance in Gaza, the Palestinians needed more than external support or promises of reform. They needed to reproduce their political legitimacy themselves.

The elections could have been turned into a political and legal battle before the world: either the will of the Palestinians in Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza would be respected, or those who disrupted them would bear responsibility for violating their democratic right.

But the postponement rearranged priorities in the opposite way: instead of asking the outside to ensure that the Palestinians exercise their right to choose, the Palestinian leadership must explain to the outside world why it did not fulfill its pledge to hold elections.

This is a cruel irony, because the Palestinian people, who demand that the world recognize their right to establish their state, find themselves required to wait again before they are allowed to choose their representatives.

The evidence does not prove that the decision to postpone was the result of a single international conspiracy or a comprehensive secret deal, nor does it prove that personal interests were the only motive behind it. But it clearly indicates that the continued absence of elections serves the survival of existing centers of influence, and keeps the Palestinians more vulnerable to external arrangements in managing their future.

More importantly, the postponement does not provide a serious guarantee that conditions in eleven months will be better than they are now.

Therefore, the conclusion reached by this investigation is that the Palestinian national interest favors holding the elections, not postponing them, which opens up new possibilities. However, if there is a real field impossibility, it must be proven publicly, the person responsible for it must be identified, and a binding plan must be drawn up to overcome it, not just change the date.

Elections are not a guarantee of ending division or occupation, but they are the primary democratic means for Palestinians to decide who speaks on their behalf.

The question that began in London in April 2025 remains present a year and a half later: If there are those who believe that the Palestinians cannot govern themselves, do we confront this claim by giving them the opportunity to choose who will govern them, or do we give them more evidence the more we postpone the elections?