Minister Zarif and the dilemma of the Iranian decision

“If our view of the region is focused on the threat, then our ambassador must be a representative of the Quds Force. If it is focused on the opportunity, he must be a merchant or a diplomat.” The above statement is part of a leaked video speech by former Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, in which he summarized the foreign policy dilemma, as the regime’s “hard core” perception of security makes managing relations with neighboring countries an extension of the military outlook based on apprehension and suspicion, and limits the possibilities for negotiation and economic and political cooperation. Zarif, in his criticism of the behavior of lamenting over the past and its symbols, denounced: “Will Qassem Soleimani return to life? Will Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah return?” The question does not aim to eliminate the political and military legacy of the two figures, because the minister, who previously complained about the interference of the commander of the “Quds Force” in the appointments of the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, realizes that destroying the symbolism that Soleimani enjoys with the “conservatives” will make him the target of more accusations that are always directed at him of “treason”... Therefore, as much as Zarif objects to turning Soleimani’s legacy into a fixed reference for national sovereign decisions, he wants to free the Iranian decision from the box of political stagnation and stagnation. Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif continues his objectionable logic, saying: “If we see Saudi Arabia as a threat, we become a threat to it.” This is a realistic description of the mechanism of generating mutual suspicion. Classifying your neighbor as a supposed danger turns into policies that push him to deal with you on this basis. However, the “security dilemma” does not eliminate responsibility for actions. Interference operations in internal affairs, and cross-border attacks via missiles and aircraftThe process gives countries' concerns a realistic content, which cannot be addressed by conciliatory language alone. Rather, the process of building confidence requires actions that can be relied upon. The discrepancy in viewpoints and work mechanism between the Iranian Foreign Ministry and the Revolutionary Guard is not a conflict between two independent authorities, because the system’s structure places supreme policy and defense within one pyramid, and gives the Supreme National Security Council the role of coordination in accordance with the directives of the Supreme Leader of the Revolution, while the Foreign Ministry implements part of the decisions without monopolizing their final formulation, which remains hostage to the balances of other regime institutions. Returning to the recent past, Minister Muhammad Jawad revealed Zarif in leaks in 2021, how “Maidan” considerations are given priority over negotiation. When Riyadh and Tehran concluded the Beijing Agreement in March 2023, the Iranian delegation was headed by the former Secretary General of the Supreme National Security Council, Ali Shamkhani, not the Minister of Foreign Affairs! Even the truce agreement was managed from within the security establishment. These arrangements do not prevent negotiations with the Islamic Republic's neighbors, but they certainly weaken the diplomat's ability to ensure the behavior of forces that he does not have the power to direct. An agreement may be concluded, and then the opposing party faces military activity or mobilizational rhetoric that contradicts and undermines it! Therefore, Zarif's reference to poems insulting Saudi Arabia is of special importance. Some platforms have perpetuated the image of Riyadh as an adversary, while the late Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei received Saudi Defense Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman on April 17, 2025, who delivered to him a written message from King Salman bin Abdulaziz. Zarif's political thesis, despite its importance, and the presence of a broad popular movement supporting it, comes from outside an institutionDecision-making: Although President Masoud Pezeshkian espouses views close to Zarif, he is not the final decision-maker in the Iranian policy-making hierarchy. Therefore, Zarif and those of the academic and political elites who support his rhetoric will remain a quarrelsome voice for the “hawkish extremists,” but - at least for the time being - he will not be able to influence Tehran’s regional policies or make them more flexible! Quoted from "An-Nahar"