Yemen and the Battle of the State

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The Houthis rushed to 'Bab al-Mandab' after they devastated Yemen, exhausted the Yemenis, and worried the neighbors. They were offered more than one opportunity for reconciliation within the framework of the state, but they insisted on residing over the ruins of its institutions, prioritizing their regional agenda over the interests of their country. They left the Yemeni legitimacy no choice but to take comprehensive action against them, which was announced by President Rashad al-Alimi yesterday.

The decision to start military operations 'to restore what remains of the lands of the republic and to establish the authority of the state' came after exhausting the opportunities for calm, as al-Alimi clarified. The Houthis responded to the opportunities for peace with further escalation and attacks on Yemenis, neighboring countries, and international waterways.

The Houthis, who engaged in some chapters after the outbreak of 'the deluge', are currently paying the price for their rush towards 'Bab al-Mandab' to link it with 'Hormuz' in an attempt to suffocate the global economy. They are paying the price for their provocations against their neighbors and their involvement in the war of straits and passages.

The Houthis could not present any convincing model within Yemen. The average Yemeni felt that he was living on the embers of illusions. There is no reconciliation or development. There is a lack of the bare minimum of acceptance of the other. They treated anyone different as if he were an enemy and looked with suspicion at every piece of advice. Instead of relying on the sympathy of the people, they chose to lean on their arsenal. Poverty has doubled, services have declined, and fear has prevailed. The Houthis have shown no serious understanding of the realities of the Yemeni structure in the areas under their control. They chose a policy of subjugation and breaking wills.

On the external front, the Houthis have shown no respect for international rules and norms. They were under the illusion that a militia could alter the balance of power by relying on a regional program that pumped extremist slogans into their veins. They mistakenly believed they could address their neighbors with missiles and drones. They misinterpreted their neighbors' policy of patience and wisdom, betting on the group's return from its adventurous approach.

Yemen cannot keep its fate hostage to a group that has exacerbated Yemeni divisions, and the regional countries cannot accept the control of such a group over a vital passage like Bab al-Mandab. If the world does not recognize Iran's right to control the Strait of Hormuz, how can it accept the situation of Bab al-Mandab being entrusted to the Houthis?

All attempts to lure the Houthis into serious dialogue have failed. It has been conclusively confirmed that they hold an antagonistic stance towards the idea of establishing a state that accommodates them and others. Their vocabulary does not recognize a place for the idea of the state and institutions. They appeared as if they were assigned a mission greater than Yemen. A mission that exported fire and imported fire.

Yemen does not need more adventures; it needs a dose of stability. It needs legitimate security institutions. It needs a government that can piece together the Yemeni parts and reignite hope.

What Alimi announced is the battle to restore the state. Yemen cannot be left as an open wound in the hands of advocates of wars that multiply the suffering of Yemenis, which is already significant.

The battle for the state is a new chapter in the life of Yemen. The suffering has been prolonged, and the wait has been long. Yemen has the right to emerge from the regional game to return to being Yemen. It has the right to heal its many wounds. Al-Alimi was clear that the battle for the state is a battle for rights and justice, not a battle for revenge or oppression.

Al-Alimi emphasized that the mission is not just to regain the land, but to restore the state to it, confirming that the new phase aims to return weapons to their 'natural place under the authority of the law.' In this statement, there is alignment with the concerns of other countries that have been affected by the 'flood' that is approaching its third anniversary. The file of factions and the containment of their weapons is open from Gaza to Iraq, passing through Lebanon, after their countries have been burdened beyond their capacity, and their regional roles have exploded along with the maps.

The flood has struck the region, then rebounded on the 'axis of resistance.' The Middle East cannot bear to remain a region filled with militias, wars, floods, and occupations. The world also cannot bear that.

Quoted from 'Asharq Al-Awsat'