The danger of armed error on the Shiites and Lebanon

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In a discussion session years ago with a prominent Hezbollah official, the man said frankly to a group of journalists: “It is not true to accuse us of being agents of Iran, for we are Iran.” Today, there is no need to ask whether the Ali al-Tahir Heights agreement included Iranian officers who exited from it in a deal before the recent Israeli attack. There is no difference between a Lebanese and an Iranian in the work of the “party” linked to the Revolutionary Guard. There is no meaning to imaginary bets and naive calls for what some call the return of its leaders to their “Lebaneseness.” They are duplicating this. On everyone in Lebanon, but their Lebaneseness extends to their Iranianness, and everyone is united in their belief in the guardianship of the jurist.

Just as the "party" is betting on the Iranian depth that supports it in confronting Israel as part of its war to support Iran, it is also relying on the "memorandum of understanding" between Washington and Tehran for a ceasefire and forcing Israel to withdraw from the south, and it rejects direct Lebanese negotiations with Tel Aviv under the auspices of America. The fact that the memorandum is in clinical death does not change the matter, in addition to the possible developments that may occur in the Iranian war and its negotiations.

This is because the “party” is playing contradiction in one game. On the one hand, it rejects direct Lebanese negotiation with Israel and the framework agreement, and insists on national reconciliation in any indirect negotiation.

On the other hand, he is unique in launching two wars to support Gaza and then Iran, contrary to the position of the popular majority and the official majority in the Council of Ministers.

The most dangerous theory that “Lammanah” is trying to establish is linking the existence of the Shiite community and ensuring its role and status in Lebanon to keeping the weapons in the hands of the “party.” The Shiites do not have an independent, separate or different fate from the fate of their Lebanese partners in all sects. The weapons that played an important role in the liberation of the south in 2000 led, in three wars, to the return of the occupation, the displacement of a million citizens from the "party" environment, the erasure of village landmarks, and the leveling of the land. There is no fear for the role and status of the Shiite sect to need weapons, unless the fear is for the “surplus power” and the dominant role it imposed. What if each sect resorted to weapons to protect its role, instead of pushing for the exclusivity of weapons in the hands of the state that protects and reassures everyone?

The experience of resisting with missiles and acting like armies is a failure. Nothing suggests that Hezbollah is willing to admit its mistake in the first place, regardless of the details and the courage of the fighters. But the old English formula: “The king cannot make mistakes” applies to “the party” because of the situation imposed on Lebanon by force of arms. Every party can make mistakes and pay the price alone. As for Hezbollah and the mistake, the country and the people pay the price.

What we paid was a lot, especially with regard to the "environment of resistance." The greatest price that everyone can pay is insisting on the mistake and maintaining a weapon that does not deter, protect, or limit the occupation. And when? After the game has ended or is about to end in the region, from Gaza to Iran. There is no role for a resistance that loses territory to the enemy. There is no role for a resistance that is satisfied with the approval of its environment, amid disagreement with the rest of the sects. Even the environment is suffering beyond what it can bear, even if the sounds remain muted. “History is a wild horse that you will fall under if you cannot tame it,” as President François Mitterrand said.