Gulf concern about China... Why does it allow the Houthis to arm?

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Concern is mounting in the Gulf states about the growing role of Chinese components in the manufacture of Houthi missiles and drones that were used to attack airports and oil installations and threaten maritime navigation.

The information revealed by press investigations and international studies indicates an important shift in arming the Houthis. The extremist group is no longer satisfied with ready-made weapons coming from Iran, but is collecting an increasing part of its arsenal inside Yemen, using equipment, materials and components imported from China.

Concern is mounting in the Gulf states about the growing role of Chinese components in the manufacture of Houthi missiles and drones that were used to attack airports and oil installations and threaten maritime navigation.

The information revealed by press investigations and international studies indicates an important shift in arming the Houthis. The extremist group is no longer satisfied with ready-made weapons coming from Iran, but is collecting an increasing part of its arsenal inside Yemen, using equipment, materials and components imported from China.

In an investigation published by Bloomberg on the twenty-third of last September, it revealed details of shipments coming from China, which were seized by the Yemeni authorities in the port of Aden, and were on their way to the port of Hodeidah, which is controlled by the Houthis. The seized items included heat-resistant chemicals used in missile manufacturing, fins and parts suspected to be intended for ballistic missiles, computer-controlled precision manufacturing machines, engines and guidance and communication systems for drones, in addition to equipment for drilling and tunnel construction.

The investigation revealed dozens of containers linked to forty-one bills of lading, many of them from the Chinese city of Guangzhou. In twenty-five cases, the name of the Yemeni importer changed during the transport of the goods, which raised suspicions about attempts to hide the party benefiting from them.

The issue does not stop at separate shipments, as reports from the Wall Street Journal revealed growing supply networks that provide the Houthis with drone engines, communication and control devices, and advanced electronic parts, some of which are available in Chinese commercial markets.

Investigations indicate that there are Yemeni shipping companies and commercial intermediaries operating inside China, purchasing components from different suppliers, before collecting them and sending them to Yemen through multiple commercial paths. These people cannot trade in such materials without the knowledge of the Chinese authorities and turning a blind eye to them.

The US sanctions have affected a number of Chinese companies accused of facilitating these operations, including companies in Shenzhen and Guangzhou that work in electronics, shipping, and supplying missile and drone guidance components.

Last July, Washington informed the UN Security Council, based on data from the United Nations Inspection and Verification Mechanism, that more than 70 percent of the prohibited or restricted dual-use goods seized between January 2025 and April 2026 were of Chinese origin.

There are accusations that go beyond supplying components, as Washington accused the Chinese satellite company Changguang of providing satellite images that help the Houthis target ships in the Red Sea. But the company denied the accusation and described it as fabricated.

As for Beijing, it rejects the accusations against it, and confirms that it implements Security Council resolutions and imposes strict controls on the export of military equipment and dual-use materials.

There is no public evidence that the Chinese government is intentionally arming the Houthis, or that manufacturers always know the final destination of their products. Many of these materials are sold legally and can be used in both civilian and military industries.

However, the increase in Chinese components does not mean the end of the Iranian role. Tehran is still a major source of designs, military expertise, and technology related to long-range missiles, while Chinese markets provide an important aspect of the equipment and components necessary to expand production inside Yemen.

Here lies the security problem for the Gulf states. The danger is no longer limited to intercepting ready-made missile shipments coming from Iran, but rather includes a wide international trade network, which can supply Houthi manufacturing workshops with thousands of parts and materials that can be converted into weapons.

Thus, the Houthi attacks on airports and oil facilities, and the growing threat to navigation in the Red Sea, raise a question that goes beyond Iran’s responsibility alone. Why is China silent about these activities that threaten countries with which it has good relations, such as Saudi Arabia? Is it really incapable of China, one of the largest industrial and commercial powers in the world, preventing the products of its companies from reaching the arsenal of the Houthis affiliated with Iran?