A former Israeli security official: Dozens of prisoners could have been returned alive, and Netanyahu failed to manage the war

Tel Aviv - Ofoq News - Dror Shalom, former head of the Political-Security Department in the Israeli Ministry of Defense, said that the war that Israel has been waging since October 7, 2023 represents a “strategic failure,” considering that Israel has achieved military achievements on several fronts, but has not succeeded in converting them into long-term political achievements.

In a lengthy interview with Yedioth Ahronoth newspaper, Shalom, who completed his mission in the Army Ministry more than half a year ago, said that it was possible to return “dozens of prisoners” in previous stages of the war, and that delaying decisions related to prisoner exchange deals led, according to his estimate, to the non-return of some of them.

Shalom served as head of the political-security department in the Ministry of the Army during the war, and worked on armament files, relations with the United States, and communications with countries in the region, in addition to the issues of the next day in the Gaza Strip and negotiations related to prisoners.

He said that the reason for conducting the interview was to oppose what he described as the "culture of silencing opinions" within the Israeli establishment, calling for allowing officials and professionals to freely present their positions, even when these positions contradict the government's directions.

He added: "This is a democratic country, and professionals do not make decisions, but rather provide advice. There is freedom to express an opinion and discipline in implementation as long as the decision is legal. People should not be afraid to express a professional opinion, as this is a recipe for the coming disaster."

Shalom: Military achievements did not turn into political achievements

Shalom said that, from his point of view, Israel has achieved military achievements on various battlefields, but he considered that the problem lies in the failure to translate these achievements into political arrangements that guarantee their continuation.

He explained that military achievement, in his opinion, is not enough without political steps that include mechanisms to end the fighting and mechanisms for closure and implementation, noting that the continuation of military operations without a political path leads, according to his assessment, to additional losses in soldiers, time, money, and international legitimacy.

He said: "There were military achievements that resulted from the integration of ground, air and intelligence capabilities, and from the spirit shown by the fighters, and I do not detract from the responsibility of the political level for that. But the problem is that military achievement is not enough without political action that turns it into a political achievement."

He added that Hamas, despite being subjected to severe blows as he described it, still controls the Gaza Strip, while he said that Hezbollah was subjected to major blows in Lebanon, but it still possesses political power and military capabilities.

Regarding Iran, Shalom referred to what he described as Israeli military achievements, but he said that the continuation of files related to the Iranian nuclear program, in addition to regional developments, led to Israel being removed from a mechanism to end the war.

He said: "In all arenas, there are still long-term achievements. I see this as a failure. Three years of war with very high costs, and at the end of it, at this stage, Israel is in an unprecedentedly damaged international situation, and relations with the United States are not in a good position."

"We learned nothing"

When asked about the reasons for describing the war as a strategic failure, Shalom said that Israel, in his opinion, did not learn the required lessons from the war.

He added: "Once again we leave opponents deterred and weak, and this seems better than a solution or trying to reach a solution. I am mainly talking about the Gaza Strip."

He considered that Israel should have worked to formulate a political path in parallel with military operations, instead of simply weakening its opponents militarily.

He said he doubted that the prisoner deal would have been completed without American pressure, adding that this file should be part of the investigation into the conduct of the war.

Accusing the government of delaying prisoners' decisions

Shalom believed that the Israeli political level was not, in his estimation, willing to end the war in the Gaza Strip, and he said that one of the reasons for this may have been the fear of forming an official investigation committee.

He added: "I do not examine hearts and intentions, but I saw a process of postponing decisions, including decisions related to prisoners."

He said that he believed, along with others, that returning the prisoners did not necessarily mean a final end to the war, and that Israel could have resumed fighting after their return.

He explained: "From my professional point of view, it was possible to return a larger number of prisoners alive."

He added that the handling of the prisoners' file should be subject to investigation, considering that "dozens of prisoners" could have been returned due to what he described as delaying approval procedures and postponing deals.

He said that some of the prisoners who died, in his assessment, could have been returned earlier.

Shalom: The prisoner deal was imposed on Netanyahu

According to Shalom, there were several points during the war at which deals could have been reached to return prisoners and declare a ceasefire, and then resume fighting later.

He said that the position opposing this idea was based on the belief that stopping the fighting would prevent Israel from resuming it later, but he believed that this fear was not justified.

He added that, according to his description, the prisoner deal that the Israeli government boasts about did not come as a result of achieving the “absolute victory” that the government talked about, but rather, according to his assessment, it came as a result of the intervention of US President Donald Trump and the popular pressure exerted by the families of the prisoners.

“Without Trump’s intervention, and without public pressure from the families, there would have been no prisoner deal,” he said.

He added that Trump's intervention also included pushing for a plan to reconstruct Gaza, considering that had it not been for this intervention, "the prisoners might have continued to die until today."

Criticism of the way the government works

Shalom spoke about his participation in the meetings of the Political-Security Ministerial Council, saying that scenes from those meetings left a profound impact on him.

According to his account, he described the atmosphere of some meetings as not appropriate for the scale of the war and losses, and said that he saw ministers preoccupied with political conflicts while Israel was suffering losses among its forces.

He added that he did not want to name the ministers he was referring to, calling for any official investigation committee to include the minutes of the Ministerial Council sessions to review what happened during them.

He said: “There was a condescending and comfortable atmosphere while we were burying our dead,” stressing that his speech did not include all ministers.

Intelligence warnings about Hamas

Shalom touched on his previous work in the Military Intelligence Division, stressing that since 2018 he had received information about a plan called “Jericho Wall,” a plan related to a large operation from the Gaza Strip.

He said that this information was referred for examination within the Intelligence Division, and that the Israeli Chief of Staff at the time, Gadi Eisenkot, treated it as a scenario that must be prepared for.

He added that the army was prepared for the possibility of Hamas carrying out a multi-pronged operation without a direct intelligence warning.

He said that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu spoke publicly, years before October 7, about the possibility of Hamas carrying out a raid.

Shalom believes that the problem, according to his assessment, was not a lack of understanding of the nature of Hamas, but rather the change in the movement’s orientation after the events of 2021, and the accompanying expansion of its military capabilities.

He added that, according to his analysis, Hamas considered the “Keeper of the Walls” events in 2021 a great success, and after that it began to focus more on building military power.

Criticism of ignoring the Palestinian issue

Shalom said that one of the basic mistakes in Israeli policy during the years before the war was dealing with the Palestinian issue and the Gaza Strip as a secondary arena.

He added that he warned of the possible deterioration of the situation in Gaza and the weakening of the Palestinian Authority, considering that the economic and humanitarian crisis in the Strip could lead to major changes.

He said he also warned that turning Gaza into a secondary arena in light of the focus on Iran and Hezbollah could lead to dangerous results.

Regarding the Qatari funds that entered the Gaza Strip, Shalom said that the Israeli security establishment was aware that there was a danger that part of these funds would reach the military wing of Hamas.

He explained that, when he was head of the Research Division of Military Intelligence, he informed the political and military levels that money could leak to the military wing of the movement.

“There was no trick from Hamas.”

Shalom touched on the information that was said to have reached Israel from the Emirates before October 7, and said that the possibility of Yahya Sinwar transmitting a message via the Emirates to Israel, according to his analysis, is not devoid of logic.

He explained that Sinwar, according to the scenario he presented, was seeking to achieve deals to release Palestinian prisoners and improve the economic situation in the Gaza Strip, while continuing to build Hamas’ military strength.

When asked whether this meant that Hamas was not planning a military operation in the first place, Shalom said that he did not believe that it was a “trick,” but rather that he saw that the movement was simultaneously seeking to achieve political goals and to prepare for a large-scale military operation.

He said that Sinwar expected the operation to lead to several days of intense fighting, followed by some sort of arrangement, but he did not expect, according to Shalom, the extent of the collapse that occurred on the Israeli side at the beginning of the war.

A former security official criticizes Netanyahu

Shalom directly criticized Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's performance during the war, saying that he believes that Netanyahu "failed miserably" in managing the war.

He said: “Netanyahu, from my point of view, is a leader who did a lot of good things, but in this war he failed miserably.”

He added that the ultimate responsibility for the work of the government and the Ministry of the Army lies with the Prime Minister, including the appointment and dismissal of army ministers.

He also talked about his exclusion from some meetings during Israel Katz's tenure as Army Ministry, and said that he continued to work on other files, including relations with the United States and other countries, and files related to military preparations towards Iran.

Relations with Washington and armaments

Shalom described working with the United States during the war as one of the main files he dealt with, pointing to coordination with the White House, the Department of Defense, and the US State Department.

He said that his mission included following up on Israel's needs for weapons, ammunition and spare parts, especially in light of what he described as the restrictions imposed by some countries on the supply of weapons to Israel.

He added that the security establishment worked to find alternatives and other sources to obtain its needs, including seeking help from third countries.

He also said that he had contacts with officials and leaders in various countries with the aim of maintaining political support for Israel and enhancing its international legitimacy.

Proposals for the next day in Gaza and the region

At the conclusion of the interview, Shalom presented a set of proposals for what the next Israeli government, according to his vision, should work on.

Regarding the Gaza Strip, he called for pushing forward the implementation of the Trump plan and finding an alternative to the Hamas-led rule.

In the West Bank, he said that the priority should be to restore what he described as governance, strengthen civil administration, stop violence, and then improve relations with the Palestinian Authority instead of continuing to weaken them.

As for Syria, he talked about the possibility of reaching security arrangements with the Syrian authorities, while in Lebanon he proposed a gradual path to disarm Hezbollah, with Arab and Gulf economic support and the participation of European forces.

He also called for strengthening relations with Egypt and Jordan, expanding Israeli normalization agreements, and deepening relations with Greece, Cyprus, Germany, India, and Japan, while avoiding turning Türkiye into an adversary.

In the relationship with the United States, he proposed launching broad cooperation in the fields of artificial intelligence and space, considering that Israel could become a regional technological center for the United States.

Shalom concluded his speech by expressing his optimism about the possibility of changing the situation, saying that there is a lot that can be done if an Israeli government comes ready to take the initiative, and he added: “There is hope.”