Is Ethiopia on the verge of collapse?

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Ethiopia is entering a new, more dangerous phase of its prolonged political crisis. Fighting has renewed in Tigray, while the federal government continues to face armed rebellions in Amhara and Oromia. The most important development came on September 20, when seven political and armed organizations announced the formation of the “Ethiopian People’s Forces for Survival Alliance,” with the declared goal of overthrowing the government of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and establishing a transitional administration.

The coalition includes the Tigray People's Liberation Front, the Fano National Movement in Amhara, and the Oromo Liberation Army, along with four organizations from the Somali, Afar and Benishangul-Gumuz regions. The importance of the alliance is not that the overthrow of Abiy Ahmed is imminent, but rather that forces with different histories and goals decided, for the first time, to unite in confronting the federal government.

Fano fought alongside federal forces against the Tigray People's Liberation Front in the 2020–2022 war. Today, the two powers sit in one alliance. The Oromo Liberation Army belongs to a different political tradition, based mainly on Oromo demands for autonomy and self-determination. Therefore, this alliance is not, so far, based on a joint political project to manage Ethiopia. It is an alliance against the existing government.

To understand the current crisis, we must return to the system that emerged after the fall of the military rule of Mengistu Haile Mariam's regime in 1991. The Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front, which was dominated by the Tigray People's Liberation Front, established a system based on ethnic federalism, and formally recognized political rights and a measure of autonomy for Ethiopia's various nationalities. The system provided a measure of stability for decades, but at the same time left deep disagreements over political influence, disputed borders and territories, and the distribution of power between the center and the regions.

When Abiy came to power in 2018, he seemed to offer a different path. He opened the political sphere, released prisoners, and sought reconciliation with Eritrea. He then dissolved the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front coalition and established the Prosperity Party, pushing for a stronger concept of Ethiopian national identity.

For Abiy’s supporters, the goal was to transcend ethnic divisions. For his opponents, the trend was toward greater concentration of power in Addis Ababa.

The dispute exploded into the Tigray War in 2020. The Pretoria Agreement in November 2022 ended the main fighting, but did not resolve the differences that led to the war. Then relations deteriorated again. Fano turned against the government, the Oromo Liberation Army insurgency continued in Oromia, and fighting has now renewed in Tigray.

Ethiopia, then, is not facing a single rebellion. It faces multiple conflicts, arising from different causes, but now meeting in the face of the federal government.

Here the main problem of the new alliance appears. Its members agree on what they want to bring down, but they do not agree on what comes after it.

The Tigray People's Liberation Front and the Oromo Liberation Army want to reduce the power of the center in favor of the regions. As for Fano, it is based on Amharic nationalism and has territorial claims, including areas in western Tigray that the Tigray People's Liberation Front considers part of its territory. Any transitional administration will have to determine who controls these areas, who controls the armed forces, and how to distribute power. These are the issues that could separate coalition members from each other.

The problem is not in the alliance announcement. The problem is in post-government management.

The strength of the coalition cannot be measured by the number of organizations that have joined it or by the number of fighters that each organization can mobilize. Its real strength lies in its geographical spread. The government faces armed opposition in more than one region at the same time, while the opposition now has political contact between forces present in different regions of the country.

But geographical spread does not mean the presence of a unified military command. There is still no joint command that can be compared to the leadership of a national army. In contrast, the government remains in control of Addis Ababa and the main state institutions, and maintains the Ethiopian National Defense Forces and significant capabilities in drones.

Therefore, the military issue is not just about who can reach the capital. The most important question is whether the government can maintain running the country while fighting on multiple fronts, and whether the coalition can turn its geographic reach into sustained military and political pressure.

Here the army factor enters.. The cohesion of the Ethiopian National Defense Forces will be an essential element in the course of the crisis. A long war imposes increasing human and financial costs, but keeping the army together gives the government significant ability to prevent the opposition from transforming its regional influence into national-level change.

The government still has a political path ahead of it in addition to the military path. The Ethiopian constitution did not abandon the federal system, and the relationship between the center and the regions, security forces, disputed areas, and political representation could theoretically be renegotiated.

But this path also has a price. If the government makes sufficient concessions, some opposition parties may find an interest in negotiating rather than continuing the war. If the concessions are limited, they may not change the calculations of the armed parties.

Thus, the main problem may become the widening gap between the state’s official control and its actual ability to manage parts of the country.

Addis Ababa may remain under government control, while large areas outside the capital become more difficult to administer. In this case, the conflict is not just a battle for power in the center, but rather a crisis in the state’s ability to exercise its authority over its entire territory.

There is another development that cannot be ignored: the United States entered the current crisis with a different security relationship with Addis Ababa than the one that existed during the previous Tigray war.

On August 19 and 20, a high-level Ethiopian military delegation held talks at the Pentagon with American officials, and the talks ended with an agreement to establish comprehensive strategic cooperation in the fields of defense and security, while expanding institutional cooperation and strategic coordination between the two military institutions.

This agreement does not mean that the United States has committed to defending Abiy Ahmed’s government, nor does it automatically mean supplying it with weapons. But it means that Washington now has a broader security channel with Addis Ababa at a time when the internal crisis has begun again.

The American position on the new fighting came quickly. On September 23, US Ambassador to Ethiopia Irvin Masinga said that the leadership of the Tigray People's Liberation Front made a bad decision to launch a massive offensive, and described the return to war as an “unwinnable battle.” He also warned of the possibility of imposing additional sanctions on leaders pushing Ethiopia towards more fighting, and called for dialogue sponsored by the African Union.

This message is important. Washington is not dealing with the renewed fighting as an Ethiopian military matter only. At the same time, it does not declare open military bias towards the government. Its declared position so far combines pressure on armed groups, a call for African dialogue, and maintaining the new security relationship with the Ethiopian state.

As the fighting expands, American diplomacy becomes more important. The United States now has a direct security relationship with Addis Ababa, and at the same time it has tools to pressure the opposition parties. Using this relationship before the conflict turns into a broader war will be much less costly than dealing with it after the intervention of regional parties becomes a reality.

This is important for Egypt as well. The longer the fighting lasts, the greater the need for the powers that have channels with the parties to the conflict to work to prevent it from turning into a regional war.

Ethiopia's crisis is no longer entirely internal. The country's location in the Horn of Africa, its relations with Sudan and Eritrea, its connection to the Red Sea, and the Renaissance Dam, all make any internal escalation susceptible to spillover to other countries.

The European Union took a different position; In April, it resumed direct support to the Ethiopian budget amounting to more than 140 million euros, within the framework of supporting reforms, development and stability. On September 28, the Union announced the allocation of 61 million euros in humanitarian aid to Ethiopia in 2026, while expressing its concern about renewed fighting in the north and calling for a reduction in escalation.

Eritrea is more closely linked to the military side. It fought alongside the Ethiopian government in the previous Tigray War, but relations between Asmara and Addis Ababa have deteriorated since then. Ethiopia accuses Eritrea of ​​supporting forces opposed to Abiy Ahmed, while Eritrea denies this. The renewed fighting in Tigray brings this relationship back to the heart of the crisis.

As for Sudan, it is in a more complicated situation. It is waging an internal war, and its borders with Ethiopia could become a path for the movement of weapons, fighters, and political influence. Any extension of the Ethiopian war to the Sudanese border will come at a time when Sudan is already suffering from a massive security and humanitarian crisis.

For Egypt, the issue is not the choice of Abiy Ahmed or his opponents.

The problem is what happens if the conflict prolongs and turns from an internal political crisis into a regional crisis. Sudan is already at war. The Ethiopian-Eritrean relationship is tense. The Red Sea cannot tolerate a new security crisis. Any large-scale movement of refugees, weapons or armed groups across borders will add a new element to these crises.

If federal authority is significantly weakened, the question will not only be political: Who rules Ethiopia? There will also be the practical question of who ensures the security and operation of the dam. Does control remain with the federal government? Are you moving to a transitional authority? Will the local authorities in Benishangul-Gumuz have a greater ability to influence it?

There is no evidence that any opposition faction is planning to seize the dam. But the existence of this amount of uncertainty about the future of Ethiopian authority is enough to make the dam part of the security calculations.

Here the concept of the national state enters the Egyptian position. Egypt does not view state unity as a position specific to Ethiopia, but rather as a principle that applies to the entire region. Cairo has maintained this position in Sudan, Libya, Yemen, and others, because weakening the central state and opening the door to multiple centers of power does not usually end at the borders of the state in which the conflict began.

For Egypt, the national state is not a political slogan, but rather part of its security calculations. Egypt cannot be for the unity of Sudan, the unity of Libya, and the stability of Yemen, and then consider the disintegration of Ethiopia an acceptable solution to its internal disputes.

Therefore, the Egyptian interest does not depend on its position on Abiy Ahmed. Egypt needs a stable Ethiopia with which it can negotiate, whatever form the political arrangement the conflict ends up in.

This position is consistent with Egyptian policy in Sudan, Libya and Yemen. Egypt's security is linked to the presence of countries capable of managing its lands and institutions, and not to supporting a specific person in each country.

Egypt does not need to join any Ethiopian party. Rather, its bias towards a specific faction will give the Ethiopian government an opportunity to present the conflict as a confrontation with external interference, instead of it remaining an Ethiopian conflict that needs a political settlement.

The most beneficial path for Egypt is to maintain contact with Addis Ababa, its channels with regional parties, and support African efforts led by the African Union, while using its relations with Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE to reduce the chances of the conflict moving into a regional confrontation.

At the same time, Ethiopia's stability remains a condition for any serious understanding regarding the Renaissance Dam. A long-term agreement on filling and operating the dam cannot be expected with a government engaged in an internal war and facing an armed challenge to its authority.

Quoted from Al-Masry Al-Youm