Henry Kissinger and the October War

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While President Anwar Sadat and the military leaders were planning the liberation of Sinai, Sadat wanted to give a final chance for a peaceful solution in which the United States would participate. Therefore, he opened a secret channel with them and tasked his national security advisor, Hafiz Ismail, to meet with Henry Kissinger, the national security advisor to President Richard Nixon, to explore the United States' willingness to participate in this solution. This meeting took place in two phases: the first in Washington in February 1973, and then in Paris in May of the same year. It was primarily and directly with Kissinger. In these sessions, Kissinger articulated his response to the Egyptian position by saying, 'Our ability to persuade, and even our desire to strongly advocate for this solution, is contingent upon the tangible changes we can point to in the Egyptian positions; this is the key.'

Hafiz Ismail records Sadat's reaction to this statement, saying: 'Egypt's national security in times of crises,' 'I saw the president lift his head, slide in his seat, and straighten up as if the message he had been waiting for had arrived.'

'We are invited to make further concessions from the positions we have reached,' Hafiz Ismail concludes: 'I did not realize that I was witnessing at that moment the president's decision that there was no escape from going to war... We had reached the end of the road in our political work.' Indeed, this was immediately followed by a meeting of the new cabinet that Sadat formed under his presidency in one of his most critical meetings, where he unanimously approved, with limited reservations, the necessity of entering into military combat. When Anwar Sadat assumed power, Kissinger's opinion of him was dismissive; however, the shift occurred with the outbreak of the October War and the military achievement of the Egyptian army.

At that point, Kissinger realized that a balance had been achieved on the ground that allowed him to intervene, especially after Sadat's invitation. Therefore, he undertook six shuttle trips between Egypt and Israel, which ended with disengagement agreements between Egypt and Syria on one side and Israel on the other.

These agreements were the foundation that Sadat developed and built upon his strategy of transitioning from war to dialogue and negotiation, which he reinforced with his visit to Israel, an event that convinced U.S. President Jimmy Carter to hold a conference at Camp David between Egypt and Israel, dedicating 13 days to it, culminating in the Camp David Accords of 1978, and then the peace agreement between Egypt and Israel, which changed the political landscape in the region.

In his book written months before his departure, "Studies on Global Strategy," Kissinger wrote about six global figures, including Anwar Sadat, and considered that they operated under difficult circumstances and changed their environment.

What Kissinger did not say about Sadat as a "statesman" is that Sadat fulfilled his long-held dream of ending the Soviet presence in Egypt (refer to the years in the White House). Sadat's opponents argue that he betrayed the forces that supported Egypt in peace and war, while President Nixon opened the U.S. military's stockpiles and sent an air bridge to Israel that saved it from defeat, then welcomed him as a hero in Cairo. Meanwhile, supporters of the school of thought that there are no morals in politics—of which Kissinger is a prominent figure—believe that without Sadat's actions, Egypt would still be negotiating over Sinai.

Quoted from "Al-Masry Al-Youm"