A new war against Iran is approaching, with regional developments putting Tehran facing a difficult reality

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Events are accelerating on more than one front, as if the region is preparing for something dangerous.

A major setback for Iran's ally in Yemen, specifically the Houthi militia, coincides with the announcement of the activation of the Mecca Agreement, which will bring two major players into the battlefield in the region: Pakistan and Turkey. This is at a time when the United States announced the sending of a third aircraft carrier to the region. Carrier Strike Group Theodore Roosevelt, accompanied by an amphibious group of 2,000 Marines led by the USS Makin Island, will add 9,000 new soldiers and sailors to the area. Reports continue daily about the arrival of American fighters, planes, and air defense platforms to several bases in the region. America had withdrawn its forces from Iraq and redeployed them in the region in a way that would reduce the danger to it from attacks by Iran and its arms upon reaching zero hour and the start of a new war expected immediately after the end of the American midterm elections on November 3.

The Houthi loss of Bab al-Mandab will affect Iran's plans to deal with the next major strike. It is working to strengthen its defensive capabilities and keep its arms in the region in a state of sufficient readiness to provide support to it in the next war. The axis of resistance praises its steadfastness until now and presents it as a victory despite all the losses and setbacks that befell it from Gaza to Lebanon to Tehran, Iraq, and now Yemen. All that the Iranian strategy revolves around is practicing a policy of brinkmanship in a way that worries the countries of the region and the world to the extent that they force Washington to stop the war and accept the Islamabad agreement, according to Tehran’s interpretation of it. If this policy fails and Iran falls into the abyss of war, the Iranian regime's goal will be to be able to survive regardless of the destruction that will befall its people. Of course, the goals of the regime's arms do not differ, and this has become clear in the actions and speeches of its leaders, as is the case in Lebanon, where it no longer matters to Hezbollah how many villages will be destroyed and occupied or how many families will be displaced or killed. As long as there is someone alive and willing to fight, the war will continue until the end. Based on the statements and speeches of Iranian leaders, it seems that Tehran expects a war similar to the 39-day war that was launched against Iran at the end of last February. But the facts indicate otherwise. Last time, Iran's economic situation was many times better than it is today, as there was no blockade on it, and the US sanctions were less effective than today. The treasury currently does not receive any imports due to Iran’s inability to sell its oil and collect what little products it is able to export via land routes. Inflation has exceeded 300 percent and the economy is in a state of near-deflation10 percent. The fuel crisis is getting worse in the country as the poverty rate is rising.

The war will begin this time without a unified leadership under a guide who exercises his duties openly before his people. Since the election of Mojtaba Khamenei to the position of Supreme Leader, no one has seen or heard from him, which has led to the spread of rumors within Iran about whether he is alive, dead, or actually capable of ruling. Disagreements are becoming more public between the leadership of the Revolutionary Guard and the political authorities in Iran over how to deal with the situation and the necessity of negotiations and giving concessions. The latest aspect of the dispute was evident in the call of some members of Parliament to hold Foreign Minister Abbas Araqji accountable for his meeting with American negotiators in New York without the Supreme Leader’s permission.

Militarily, the American forces will return to confrontation after six months of preparation, after a round of fighting that enabled them to identify the strengths and weaknesses of their ranks and of the Iranian side. Also, this time, Washington has become aware that the regime is incapable of reforming itself or bringing about change from within, and therefore, it may not mind going to the end, that is, toppling it. The ceasefire period also allowed the Gulf countries to prepare defensively and rebuild their stock of Patriot and THAAD missiles and other modern air defenses to deal with ballistic, cruise and drone missiles. Some analysts believe that the Gulf states will be more prepared this time to respond militarily to Iranian attacks.

Iran took advantage of the ceasefire period to try to strengthen its forces again. According to intelligence reports, Tehran was able to restore some missile cities inside the mountains that were severely bombed and led to the confinement of many missile launchers inside tunnels. Iran also assembled additional missiles and updated them and their drones using some Chinese electronic systems. Iran obtained some weapons from Russia through the Caspian Sea, but not in large quantities. Iran still suffers from its lack of effective air defenses against American fighters and bombers. The balance of power between it and America and Israel is very large, and the last six months are insufficient for Iran to obtain anything that will affect this power difference.

The entry of Pakistan and Turkey into the arena of confrontation through the Mecca Agreement will be a new and important factor, although it is not yet clear what forces they will send to Saudi Arabia to contribute to its defense operations. They are two major military powers and are located on Iran's direct borders.

Therefore, Tehran will be forced to review its plans and calculations, especially with regard to targeting the Kingdom, as it did during the last war. Tehran will follow with great interest how the Mecca Alliance will act in the face of the Houthi attacks on the Kingdom. Will he be satisfied with air defense steps only, or will he launch counter-strikes against the Houthis inside Yemen? There are many questions in the midst of rapid developments that put the Iranian leadership before fateful decisions. The window for diplomacy is still open, but time is quickly running out. Will the regime take advantage of it?