"Al-Aqsa Flood"... when others won and Palestine lost

Listen to the article. The audio text is automated, generated by an automated system

The third anniversary of the "Al-Aqsa Flood" operation, which changed the face of the Middle East, came a few days ago, and many fear that it has put the region on the path to changing its maps as well.

I still remember the first moments and first days of the operation: a welcome mass uproar, and statements by the leaders of the resistance axis and their supporters declaring the near end of the State of Israel. I still remember the treason campaigns we were subjected to, we who took a position rejecting the operation, and we went further than that when we said that killing civilians is a terrorist act, which cannot be justified by any pretext.

Lists of our names were published, claiming that we were Israeli agents, and that these lists were found on enemy computers. Just imagine that an enemy keeps lists of the names of his clients, attached to their social media accounts, on a computer.

I remember that, after October 7, I was a guest on a television station, and I said, in other words, that Hamas leaders had committed a crime against Palestine and the Palestinians. That day, my husband sent me a message while I was on the air, in which he said: “Forget Hamas, you don’t need more opponents.” Naturally, I did not listen to his advice, because I was certain that Palestine would be the first to pay the price for what Yahya Sinwar did.

A few days ago, we survived a disaster whose repercussions could have exceeded the disasters left behind by the “Al-Aqsa Flood.” I mean the Flydubai incident. As I read successive reports about the incident, only one question came to mind: If the operation had succeeded, how many of us would have celebrated it and considered it a new victory?

Under the pretext of October 7, here is the Israeli Prime Minister killing and destroying without accountability, while the Palestinian cause pays the price, and with it the Palestinians themselves. And now the news of Gaza has retreated to the end of the news bulletins, as we are people who have become accustomed to death and killing.

The former Secretary-General of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, entered the battle under the pretext of supporting Gaza. The result was the destruction of Lebanon, a price paid by the party itself and its leaders. However, the remnants of the “party”, at the behest of Tehran, still adhere to a policy that does not seem to end except with the destruction of the last stone in Lebanon.

As for Netanyahu, he continues his daily attacks on Syrian sovereignty, citing fear of a repetition of what happened on that fateful day on the Syrian border. This happens despite the fact that the authority in Damascus has confirmed, since coming to power, that it does not seek war, and does not pose a threat to any party, including Israel.

However, let us stop at a different kind of question: It is true that Palestine and the Palestinians lost a lot, but did not the repercussions of the October 7 battle lead to “victories” of another kind in the region? Wasn't the exhaustion and weakening of Hamas and Hezbollah the beginning of the decline of Iran's axis in the region? Didn't the fighters in Syria take advantage of the weakness of Iran and its militias and the collapse of Assad's army, and seize the moment to implement the "deterrence of aggression" operation that liberated Syria from both Iran and Assad? This is what the fighters themselves say about their experience.

Were not the weakening of Hezbollah and the fall of Assad essential factors in the arrival of a government in Lebanon declaring that restoring state sovereignty over the entire Lebanese territory had become a priority?

It was a moment in which the interests of friends and enemies intersected, and this is neither a shame nor a betrayal. Convergence of interests does not mean identical goals, just as taking advantage of a political moment does not mean being dependent on whoever benefits from it with you. Countries in the region have declared war on militias whose authority is contested by the state and are imposing wars on societies that they do not decide on their own. This confrontation, which some are trying to portray as a service to Israel, is in the interest of the state, in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, and everywhere that remains under the threat of Iranian militias.

If we look at the scene a little further, we will find that the state’s success in this confrontation does not only mean weakening the extremism of political Islam militias, both Shiite and Sunni, especially the forces allied with Tehran, which are today facing a clear decline in their influence. Rather, it may also open the door to weakening Israeli extremism, which benefits from the presence of armed opponents and open wars to justify its expansionist policies and evade any accountability.

But this path will not be complete without Palestinian vigilance. Vigilance saves a just cause defended by failed lawyers, some of whom have even turned it into a profitable business, while the Palestinian people continue to pay the bill with their blood, land, and future.

The Palestinians must reclaim their cause from its merchants. When these merchants sat at the negotiating tables, they forgot the issue, they forgot the people of Gaza, and they did not give its children a single carton of milk. While the Palestinians were facing death, hunger, and displacement, those who were supposed to represent them were dealing with their tragedy as a negotiating card, and with their sacrifices as a political asset.

Three years after October 7, the question is no longer who won in the first hours, nor who launched the first missile, nor who raised the loudest slogans. The real question is: Who has a homeland left, whose people lost their future, and who turned blood into influence and devastation into political gains?

The balance of power may change, regimes may fall and militias may retreat, and countries may find an opportunity to regain their sovereignty. But none of this is a complete victory unless the Palestinians regain their right to life, liberty, and a state, and unless their cause is liberated from those who hide behind its justice to justify their adventures, and then leave its people alone to face the consequences.

The Palestinian issue is bigger than Hamas, bigger than Hezbollah, bigger than Iran, and it is bigger than everyone who trades in it in the name of resistance. Palestine is not an arena for settling scores, nor fuel for other people's projects, nor a card in the hands of those who decide to go to war and then leave its people to pay the price. If October 7 changed the Middle East, the real test today is whether the Palestinians will regain their decision and cause, or will they let others write their future again, this time as well in their blood.

Until then, all countries in the region must continue the battle, the battle between the state and the arena, between sovereignty and the cross-border militias. No matter how great the price of the battle is, the cost remains less than the cost of the militias remaining in control of the decision.