Consequences of postponing the Palestinian elections

Writer: Jamal Zaqout

It seems that the question today is no longer just: Will the Palestinian legislative elections be held as scheduled on November 28, or will they be postponed? The most important question is what the process of preparing for it reveals about the nature of the political process that was intended to renew legitimacy, and what should be done to prevent delay from being used to reproduce the crisis or exclude political forces from the national scene.

The obstacles facing the elections in Gaza and Jerusalem did not appear suddenly, and they were supposed to be at the heart of the preparation for them, and not be brought up later to justify their impossibility. Why was the election decree issued and its date set without a serious national dialogue that addresses the repercussions of division and the war of extermination, and creates the conditions for free, comprehensive and credible elections?

Was the dialogue to prepare the elections or to postpone their postponement?

The course of the dialogue raises serious questions about its actual purpose. Instead of being an entry point to agreeing on the rules of the elections and guarantees for participation in them, its outcomes seem closer to creating political cover for a decision to postpone the elections that had previously been taken. If this is true, then we are not faced with a dialogue that was unable to accomplish its mission, but rather we are facing the use of dialogue to justify a decision whose real subject was not subject to negotiation.

This question is deepened in view of the so-called electoral colleges for the National Council, which were organized in a unilateral manner, without serious standards that guarantee pluralism and equal opportunities. Elections are not arrangements managed from above, and they should not be transformed into a selective mechanism that determines in advance who is entitled to participate in the political scene and who is left outside it.

But what is most dangerous is the continued exclusion of major political forces from joining the Palestine Liberation Organization, while there are indications that the exclusion may extend to the elections, based on a perception that makes those outside government outside of politics as well. This turns the meaning of democracy upside down. The essence of elections is to allow competition and the transfer of power, not to monopolize political participation or subject it to rules determined by the dominant party.

Here a question arises that cannot be ignored: Was the call for elections used, without serious national preparation of the conditions for their success, to open the way for a process that excludes basic forces from the scene, after the genocide failed to eradicate their presence from Palestinian society? Indicators alone are not sufficient to confirm intentions, but they require a clear political confrontation that prevents exclusion from becoming a fait accompli. Reproducing eradication using political tools does not address the national crisis, but rather deepens the impasse and danger of division and weakens the ability to confront plans to liquidate the Palestinian issue.

How do we prevent postponement from becoming a tool for exclusion?

Confronting this possibility begins with a clear national position that rejects the monopoly of political decision-making, and at the same time refuses to use real obstacles as an excuse to suspend the democratic entitlement. This requires a declared consensus to guarantee the right of all political forces to participate, according to fair and equal electoral rules and transparent standards, including for the National Council in the diaspora, and independent oversight of their application. A comprehensive national dialogue should also be opened, not limited to decision-making centers and influential factions, but rather including forces excluded from the PLO institutions and components of Palestinian society, with the aim of addressing the representation crisis, not perpetuating it.

If it is not possible to hold the elections on time, the specific reasons must be announced, the authorities responsible for addressing each obstacle must be appointed, a binding timetable must be set, and a new and final date for voting must be set from the moment the postponement is announced. The implementation of these commitments must be subject to joint national oversight, so that postponement does not turn into an open extension of the status quo.

As for the Israeli obstacles in Jerusalem and Gaza, they should be turned into an organized political and diplomatic issue, and work should be done to extract the necessary guarantees to hold elections, instead of letting the occupation decide when the Palestinians exercise their right to renew their legitimacy. If division and lack of consensus are among the causes of impossibility, then addressing them must be part of a path with specific results and duration, not an excuse for the continuation of the crisis.

In this context, it is the responsibility of the leadership of the Popular Front to declare a clear position regarding any attempt to use its initiative to pass a postponement, while ignoring the rest of its interconnected elements. It is not permissible for the initiative to turn into a way out for the dominant leadership from deserving elections, without an equal commitment to the rest of the national obligations. Likewise, it is not permissible for the rest of the factions, whether in loyalist or opposition positions, to simply object to exclusivity and possession, without bearing a joint responsibility to change it.

This requires agreement on a short and specific transitional phase, during which a consensual government with a clear political mandate will unify the administration of Gaza and the West Bank, stabilize the unity of institutions, and create the conditions for elections, in parallel with rebuilding the PLO on democratic and participatory foundations. This government is not an alternative to elections or a means to extend the status quo, but rather a tool for achieving specific entitlements, subject to national accountability and oversight.

The crisis of legitimacy has become part of the crisis of the entire political system. Therefore, it is not enough to postpone the elections or change their date. Rather, the path that led to the crisis must be changed, and respect must be restored to the popular will as the source of legitimacy, and to pluralism as a condition for national unity, not a threat to it.

The question remains: Will the postponement, if it occurs, be an entry point to correct the course and restore legitimacy, or a tool to prolong the crisis and exclude political forces from the scene? Preventing the second possibility cannot be done by warning alone, but by imposing a binding national consensus that guarantees participation, defines responsibilities and deadlines, and holds everyone accountable. What is required is not elections at any cost, nor postponement without a horizon, but rather an inclusive democratic path that prevents the monopoly of politics, fortifies national representation in the face of the dangers of liquidation, and prevents Palestinian sacrifices from being wasted in conflicts of exclusion and the perpetuation of division.