Egypt's entry into the war

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In fact, Egypt was expected to participate in the Gulf front in confronting Iran and its agents in Iraq and Yemen. This is one of the necessities of Egypt's regional balance of power itself.

After Cairo announced its readiness to participate, we expect that this official Egyptian position will be met with skepticism and criticism from various hateful and skeptical parties: Why did Cairo not participate ten months ago? Does its position have anything to do with the Saudi financial deposit? Or is it just verbal promises?

But Cairo, against its will, became a party to the war. It was directly targeted with projectiles, and explicit threats were made against it before from Iranian groups in Yemen and Iraq.

For three years, Egypt has been paying the price for Houthi attacks on navigation in the Red Sea from its revenues in hard currency. Its cost exceeded the repercussions of the wars in Libya, Sudan, and Gaza combined. Cairo loses about six billion dollars annually in Suez Canal revenues, according to international estimates.

The Egyptian economy faces the most serious threat to it as a result of the repercussions of the war on Egyptians working in the Gulf. More than five million Egyptians work in five Gulf countries, and their jobs and incomes may be at risk as the war continues and these countries’ oil and gas exports decline.

Under the leadership of President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, Cairo has never been keen on fighting wars. But these Gulf wars put Egypt in the line of fire without choosing it. The challenge goes beyond economic dangers and the threat to the livelihood of millions of Egyptians. The emergence of Iran as a dominant power in the Gulf will reduce Egypt’s influence and threaten its national security.

Cairo was the arena of an undeclared confrontation between the Gulf governments and the Iranian regime, after the Brotherhood came to power. At that time, Tehran sought, through a series of moves, to support the “Brotherhood” and strengthen its control over the state.

President Sisi’s announcement of his readiness to enter the war sends a clear message to Tehran, which benefits from Gulf disputes and the absence of Arab support, which have left the Gulf divided and isolated.

Regarding the timing of Egypt’s move today, and not months ago, there may be understandable considerations behind it: providing the opportunity for negotiation and reconciliation, and avoiding appearing on a single front with Washington against Iran.

There are those who want to reduce Cairo's motives to financial compensation. But the equation goes beyond that. The rise of Iran will be at the expense of Egypt, which is moving to defend its interests, influence, and economy. Tehran will return to interfere in Egypt's affairs and destabilize it, as it has already done so. It is also defending its economic security, as the losses of the Suez Canal due to the Houthis and Iran amount to about six billion dollars annually ($18 billion during three years of targeting navigation and the reluctance of ships to pass through the canal), and in addition to the losses of the canal, the war threatens the livelihood of millions of Egyptians in the Gulf.

The final question remains: Will Egyptian participation change the military equation on the ground? The matter depends on its nature and size, which we are waiting for to become clear.

Politically, Cairo is sending a message to Iran and the Arab world: It is no longer possible to remain silent about the Iranian war in the Gulf.

Quoted from "Al-Sharq Al-Awsat"