From the Destruction of the Authority to the Re-engineering of the Palestinian Sphere: Questions Before the National Dialogue

Writer

Ashraf Akka

The Israeli discourse regarding the Palestinian Authority has shifted from mere criticism of its performance or objections to its political positions to a more direct and dangerous trajectory. The focus has moved to exploring the future, function, and limits of the Authority's existence. What Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant said on October 6, 2026, before the Israeli government about the army's readiness for a war scenario with the Palestinian Authority raises a question that goes beyond the statement itself: Are we facing a temporary military threat to the Authority, or is this an Israeli redefinition of its status within the Palestinian political system?

Gallant stated that the army is preparing for the possibility that elements from the Palestinian security services or affiliated organizations might direct weapons against settlers and the army. In this case, Israel would launch a wide campaign against the Authority, including military operations in cities and camps, targeting leaders, and destroying structures that Israel considers armed. However, the striking paradox is that Israeli military sources have indicated that there is no concrete intelligence suggesting that the Authority's agencies are planning such a scenario, and that this is about preparing for extreme scenarios.

This paradox deserves attention, as it shifts the discussion from the question: Will a confrontation erupt between Israel and the Authority? to a deeper question: Why has the scenario of confrontation with the Authority itself become part of the Israeli political and security discourse at this moment?

In September, Katz had already threatened a "total war" against the authority if its agencies, according to the Israeli scenario, carried out an attack similar to the one on October 7. At the beginning of October, National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir went further by declaring that the entire West Bank belongs to Israel and threatened to dismantle the Palestinian Authority if he took over the Ministry of Defense.

When these statements are placed side by side, they reveal a shift in the nature of the discourse: the authority is no longer presented merely as a Palestinian institution that should be pressured or reformed, but as part of a security equation that can, in some Israeli political scenarios, be dismantled.

But the more important question is: if Israel is talking about dismantling the authority, what alternative is being built on the ground? Here the picture becomes more complicated; as statements against the authority escalate, the process of reshaping Palestinian geography is also accelerating. Settlement projects, roads, and the expansion of outposts and settlement blocs, foremost among them the E1 project, do not wait for the results of the Israeli elections. Mechanisms linked to thousands of settlement units in the area have been pushed forward, while the deadlines for bids approached the date of the Israeli elections on October 27. Here we reach the crux of the matter: Israel is not only redefining the authority but also redefining the space in which the authority is supposed to operate.

Between engineering Palestinian space and national dialogue and elections, "the ballot box produces legitimacy, but the land produces facts."

When geography changes through settlement, roads, barriers, and the expansion of Israeli control, and when Jerusalem becomes more isolated from its Palestinian surroundings, and when the possibility of geographic connection between parts of the West Bank erodes, any discussion about the future of the authority becomes incomplete if it is not read in parallel with the future of the land it is supposed to govern. This is the paradox that Palestinians will face in the upcoming phase: while the Palestinian arena prepares to re-produce its legitimacy through elections, facts are being produced on the ground that may pre-determine the limits of this legitimacy's ability to transform into actual authority. Therefore, the upcoming Palestinian elections should not be viewed as the end of the political crisis, but rather as the beginning of a new test: can electoral legitimacy transform into the ability to govern?

The Palestinian issue is no longer just about the absence of legitimacy or political division, but rather about the gap between legitimacy and capability. It may be possible for the box to produce a leadership, a legislative council, or a new political composition, but that does not automatically mean having the ability to manage Gaza and the West Bank, or to control geography, resources, movement, security, or foreign relations. Here, the concept of 'suspended legitimacy' emerges: legitimacy produced by elections, but finds itself trapped in a political, geographical, and security reality that limits its ability to exercise its effects.

Therefore, the question that should be raised Palestinian, regionally, and internationally is not only: who will win the elections? But: what will the winner be able to do?

This particular point brings us back to the Palestinian Authority. If some Israeli rhetoric talks about the destruction of the Authority, the corresponding question is: Is the intention really to end the Palestinian institutions, or to reshape them so that they become more connected to security and administrative functions and less capable of transforming into a nucleus of a state? Here, we can distinguish between 'overthrowing the Authority' and redefining it, which means ending its existing structure. On the other hand, redefining it means maintaining its institutions but changing its functions, boundaries, areas of work, and conditions for its survival. In the second case, the Authority may remain in existence, may receive financial and political support, and may become more capable of providing services and managing the population, but it remains unable to possess the essential elements of sovereignty (and this leads to another concept that can explain part of the upcoming phase: 'stability without sovereignty' may become what is required from the Palestinian Authority to be able to manage society, prevent collapse, contribute to security control, absorb aid, participate in the reconstruction of Gaza, and maintain institutions; but without necessarily meaning that it possesses control over land, borders, or security domains. Thus, the Authority can become more capable of management at a time when the state becomes further out of reach. The greatest danger does not relate solely to the Authority; it concerns the unity of the Palestinian political system. Gaza is entering a complex transitional phase, while the West Bank continues to be under pressure from settlement activities, military operations, and movement restrictions. If the two paths are not politically and institutionally reconnected, the division may transform from a political division into a 'functional division': Gaza is managed by a special transitional system, while the West Bank is managed through the Authority, while the distance between the two geographies widens. Here, the phrase 'the day after in Gaza' becomes insufficient. The real question is: What will the day after be for the Palestinian political system? Will Gaza be a gateway to rebuilding a unified Palestinian system? Or will it become a separate administrative and security path? Will elections lead to rebuilding the relationship between Gaza and the West Bank, the PLO, and the Authority, or will they reproduce the existing institutions without a fundamental change in the structure of the system?

The adjacent elections

The above questions become more urgent as the Israeli and Palestinian elections approach each other in time. Israel is electing a new government on October 27, and Palestinians are heading towards legislative elections on November 28, meaning we are facing adjacent elections within one conflict, but the two sides do not enter the electoral process from the same position.

Israelis are electing a government that possesses the tools of the state, power, and control over the land, while Palestinians are trying, through elections, to reproduce political and institutional legitimacy within a geography where large parts are still under Israeli control. Therefore, the result of the Israeli elections, whatever its composition, should not be read only through the names of parties and coalitions, but rather through a more stable question: Will the strategy towards the West Bank, the Authority, and settlements change, or will the tools change while the basic trends continue? In contrast, Palestinian elections should not only be measured by their ability to produce new legitimacy, but by their ability to transform that legitimacy into governability. Governability is not a political slogan; it is a system of legitimacy, institutions, resources, geography, security, recognition, and the ability to implement decisions.

Here, the Palestinian issue intersects with broader regional and international transformations. International powers may support the continuation of Palestinian institutions, conducting elections, and the reconstruction of Gaza, but they may tie support, funding, and political arrangements to conditions related to security, the nature of authority, the weapons of factions, and the relationship with Israel. Thus, a state of 'selective legitimacy' may arise: recognition of elections and institutions, in exchange for imposed limits on the political outcomes that this legitimacy can produce. Therefore, the upcoming battle will not only be about who governs the Palestinians, but about who determines the function of Palestinian governance.

Here, I believe that Katz's statement should be read within a broader context. It does not necessarily provide evidence of an inevitable Israeli decision to destroy the Authority, especially in light of Israeli military sources confirming that there is no concrete information about a planned rebellion by the Authority's apparatuses. However, it reveals that the possibility of confrontation with the Authority has become an openly declared part of the Israeli security and political discourse, at a time when statements about dismantling the Authority coincide with steps to reshape the land and a heated Israeli electoral battle. Hence, the more precise question is not: Does Israel want to destroy the Authority? But rather: What kind of Palestinian Authority would Israel accept its existence? This question opens the door to a larger question: Is the goal to maintain the Authority as a tool for managing the population, or to allow it to evolve into a political institution capable of producing a state?

If the conflict in the past revolved around the existence of authority, today the conflict may shift to another level: the struggle for its function. Here we reach the essence of the stage: the Palestinians are facing a race between legitimacy produced by the ballot boxes and realities produced by the land. If the new legitimacy cannot regain the ability to govern, it may find itself facing a reality that has preceded it in redefining the limits of the possible. Therefore, the upcoming Palestinian battle is not just an electoral battle, nor is it merely a battle for the survival of authority, and it is not even solely a battle for Gaza. It is a battle over the shape of the future Palestinian political system. Either the elections will become an entry point for rebuilding the political system, reconnecting Gaza with the West Bank, redefining the relationship between the authority, the PLO, and Palestinian society, and transforming legitimacy into political power; or legitimacy will remain while realities continue to define its limits.

The Equation of the Upcoming Stage

The Palestinian equation is determined by a collective national balance through posing the most pressing question: What remains of the authority if the institutions remain but the ability to shape the future does not? Who holds legitimacy? Who creates realities? Who defines geography? And who has the ability to transform legitimacy into sovereignty? The equation of the upcoming stage is titled: The important battle is not the survival or fall of the authority, but whether the Palestinian situation will enter a phase of rebuilding a political system capable of shaping the future, or a phase of managing a reality that has already been meticulously engineered on the ground.