Saudi Arabia's security and Yemen's stability

In an interview with the English channel Russia Today, I was asked questions about the Houthi escalation, Saudi Arabia’s ability to protect its lands, the role of Turkey and Pakistan in the Mecca Pact, and the chances of the Yemeni state regaining its capital. Despite the differences in these questions, they converge on one issue: How can military power be transformed into sustainable security and a settlement that ends the war instead of postponing its next round? One of the questions linked the volume of Saudi defense spending to the continuation of Houthi attacks, as if possessing advanced systems was supposed to prevent the arrival of any missile or drone. This is a standard that even major powers cannot stand. The Russian-Ukrainian war has shown that the wide disparity in capabilities does not prevent the less powerful party from harming its opponent. The comparison here is within the limits of military capability, without equality between the causes of wars or the legitimacy of its parties. Saudi Arabia protects a vast area, cities, airports, and vital installations, while the attacker can focus his efforts on a target whose timing he chooses. Also, describing the Houthis as a group with limited capabilities ignores the missiles, drones, expertise, and external support they have accumulated. Therefore, the success of defense is measured by the amount of danger it prevents, the losses it reduces, the continuity of life and services, and the speed of redressing damages, while reviewing gaps and improving performance.

The ability to harm does not equal the ability to win. An attack may achieve a wide media impact, without changing the balance of power or imposing the attacker's conditions. It is a mistake to allow the image of an explosion to summarize the scene, ignoring the thwarted threats, the continued economic activity, and the options that the defending party has. In this context, the Mecca Pact gains its importance. Saudi-Turkish-Pakistani cooperation expands the base of deterrence and gives the commitment to the security of member states practical guarantee. As Saudi Arabia develops its own capabilities, it strengthens its partnerships. This is behavior followed by major powers as well, recognizing the value of defense coordination, information exchange, and integration of expertise. The defense character of the alliance remains essential to understanding its role. The deployment of forces to protect Saudi territory does not automatically mean entering into a ground war inside Yemen. Türkiye's membership in NATO does not make its participation an Atlantic decision, and Pakistan's possession of a nuclear weapon does not turn the confrontation into a nuclear crisis. The most important thing is the political message: the attack on Saudi Arabia requires solidarity and joint capabilities, which increases its cost and limits the chances of it being repeated. As for the question about a broad Saudi ground intervention, its answer starts from the political goal. Having an ability does not require it to be used in every possible way. Saudi interests require that the Yemenis regain their state, and that their forces bear responsibility for their land, with support that enhances their ability to succeed. Any progress needs institutions to manage it, local forces to protect it, and residents who trust that what comes after the battle will be better than what came before it. This is why the gains announced by the Yemeni forces near Bab al-Mandab carry an importance that goes beyond the borders of the regained areas. It provides an opportunity to downsizeThreatening navigation, relieving pressure on trade, and improving the position of the Yemeni government. But investing in it requires cohesion of ranks, coordination of efforts between government forces, the giants, the National Shield, and other forces supporting the state, and linking progress to the stability of the regions and the protection of their people. Restoring Sanaa remains a goal that goes beyond military control of the capital. Success requires a national project that reassures the population, brings together Yemeni forces, and provides an alternative capable of governance and services. The years of Houthi control do not mean that change is impossible; But it emphasizes the importance of local understandings, restoring confidence, and opening the way for a transition that limits losses and preserves state institutions. I believe that Saudi Arabia and its partners have an important opportunity to translate their superiority in resources into sustainable political and security results. This depends on clarity of goals, unity of partners, and good management of gains. The most effective indicators of success are the decline in attacks, the stability of the regained areas, the security of navigation, and the improvement of the lives of Yemenis. These are results that are difficult to reduce to war propaganda or a statement of victory. As for the end that is worth working for, it requires more than a temporary ceasefire. Yemen needs an inclusive political settlement, heavy weapons subject to state authority, verifiable guarantees that prevent attacks on the neighborhood and threats to navigation, and reconstruction that gives people a tangible interest in stability. Political action will be available according to common rules, without any party retaining the privilege of imposing its will with weapons. Saudi Arabia needs a safe and stable neighbor, and Yemen needs a state that preserves the dignity of its citizens and invests its resources in their interest. In the intersection of these two interests lies the opportunity for lasting peace. Peace backed by strength,It is protected by institutions, and Yemenis find in it a future worth defending.