The new Israeli national security concept: Conceptual framing and questions for discussion

Writer: Retired Major General: Ahmed Issa

On Wednesday, October 7, 2026, Tamir Heyman, President of the Israel Institute for National Security Studies, published a special post on the institute’s official page entitled “The New Israeli National Security Concept: Conceptual Framing and Questions for Discussion.”

Below is a condensed translation of his paper that preserves the ten principles and six axes of criticism, then my comment. It is necessary to note that Heyman presents these principles as his subjective theoretical reading of the implemented policies, and not an official document announced by Israel.

Translation

Israeli national security doctrine is at a turning point that calls for examination. Since October 7, 2023, Israeli security policy seems to be practically guided by a new doctrine, different from the unwritten doctrine that has been formed over decades.

Despite the shortcomings of the previous doctrine, it contributed to transforming Israel into a prosperous regional power (as Heyman described it). Perhaps its correct implementation would have prevented the massive failure on October 7, but an official investigation committee is the one that must decide that.

As for the new doctrine, it was not formulated and disseminated to the public, nor was it adopted in a binding manner within the security institution, but its principles actually influence decision-making and guide security behavior.

Three hierarchically interrelated concepts should be distinguished: national identity, security doctrine, and security policy. The security doctrine derives its reference from the identity of the state, its constitution, if any, and its founding legacy, and therefore it is supposed to enjoy relative stability and not change with the change of governments. As for security policy, it is the application of this doctrine in accordance with the government’s ideology and political calculations.

Therefore, a profound change in security doctrine, unlike policy change, affects the country's national identity and international standing, and deserves in-depth discussion.

This article aims not only to discuss security militarily, but to reveal the possibility of a deeper change in Israeli national identity. The question posed by Heyman is: Who are we after October 7th?

Principles of the “new” doctrine drawn from practice

1. The priority of Jewish identity over democracy

The state's Judaism takes precedence over its democratic system, to ensure that it remains a Jewish state, even at the expense of the erosion of democratic values. This identity is based on ethnic, religious and national foundations, and on Jewish heritage and traditions. This requires maintaining the superiority of the Jewish identity over other national identities, including the Arab, Islamic and Christian identity.

2. Peace is a means, not an end

This vision assumes that every settlement with an Arab party is temporary and misleading, and that pursuing it may reproduce the “preconception” error that is a central cause of the October 7 disaster.

According to it, it is not possible to achieve fundamental peace in the Middle East. The agreements are technical and temporary, and need constant review. Therefore, peace is not seen as a value that produces security, but rather as a tool to achieve other political goals. Politically, peace is naively associated with the left and the “peace camp,” as opposed to security associated with the right and the “security camp.”

3. Denying the independent components of the Arab countries

The doctrine assumes that most Arab states are not true nation-states, but rather tribal and sectarian groupings that lack a shared history and a foundational national vision. Accordingly, its destabilization is seen as a natural process, which Israel can deal with better than dealing with strong nation-states, and can even encourage it.

4. War is a permanent, basic condition

War is necessary for national security, and peace cannot replace it, because it is a means, not an end. According to the slogan “Calm is a Swamp,” seeking calm becomes an expression of weakness.

This view considers that viewing war as a necessary evil that should be avoided, and the long pursuit of settlements, were at the root of the mistake that led to October 7th. Preventive war is preferred because it allows for an important achievement from its beginning. The intensity of the war may change, but its continuation is seen as a security advantage.

5. Self-reliance and freedom from dependence on the United States

Israeli security is based on Israel's capabilities alone, and does not require special support from a superpower. The relationship with Washington is important, but it is based on interests only.

This vision considers excessive adherence to American restrictions to be dangerous, because the United States is a “declining power” that will abandon Israel due to its social and political transformations. Relying on it also exposes Israel to the influence of progressive American values ​​that are incompatible with its Jewish character. Therefore, separation from it becomes inevitable, and even necessary for independence and the cohesion of Jewish identity.

6. Absolute priority of initiative and attack over defence

A surprise preventive war is the only path to victory. If Israel is unable to confront a surprise attack, and to guarantee a reliable warning that precedes it, the only conclusion is to adopt a continuous policy of attacks and preventive wars.

7. Frontal defense

When a pre-emptive attack is not possible or requires time to prepare for, forward defense areas should be established wherever possible.

These areas provide defensive depth against “terrorist armies,” contribute to destabilizing and weakening the host state, and also allow the war to be quickly transferred to enemy territory. It does not interfere with the offensive initiative; In practice, it is part of a delayed attack.

8. Considering the Palestinian-Israeli conflict as a permanent Israeli-Arab conflict

According to this doctrine, the Palestinian national movement is not authentic, but rather a Western narrative resulting from a feeling of guilt associated with the colonial legacy. The renewed Palestinian struggle is interpreted as another Arab attempt to fight and destroy Israel.

It is based on the depth of the conflict and the failure to recognize Israel as a Jewish state to conclude the impossibility of a solution, and thus reject any political, geographic, or security separation between Israel and a Palestinian entity, and reject the establishment of a Palestinian state.

Security is supposed to be achieved by deepening settlement inside and outside the “Green Line,” considering this line to be imaginary. As for Arab residents of historic Palestine who choose to remain in the Jewish state, they are granted rights of residence and independent local government.

9. Settlements and civilians are a central component of security

This vision represents a return to the principles of the period before the establishment of the state, when security was based on settlement and local defense organized by civilians within paramilitary formations.

In its modern form, security is no longer the responsibility of the security services alone. Rather, civilians become part of the defense network, through the establishment of settlements and outposts in areas of contact with the Arab population, in the West Bank and security areas in Syria, Lebanon, and the Gaza Strip.

This deployment obligates the army to implement pre-emptive attack and forward defense, and also contributes to destabilizing the Arab countries, which this vision describes as “artificial.”

10. The priority of military-industrial independence

Because of the sensitivity of the security economy to long supply chains, domestic production and investment in military industries, cybersecurity, and artificial intelligence should be favored over other sectors.

Priority is given to science supporting technology, but through independent development, rather than relying on international cooperation frameworks, such as the Horizon programme.

Critical Questions: Conflict with Traditional Doctrine

Heyman stresses that the national shock and changing threat perception after October 7 necessitate adjusting some aspects of security doctrine. But if the previous principles truly express the new doctrine, they profoundly contradict the foundations of the traditional doctrine, and reveal a radical shift in the state’s identity.

1. The state of the Jewish people or a state designated for the Jews?

According to the author’s reading of the Declaration of Independence, Israel was established as a Jewish state committed to freedom, justice, peace, and social and political equality for all citizens without religious, ethnic, or sexual discrimination. What was meant was not a religious state governed by Jewish legislation that served the superiority of Jews over others.

He wonders: What does it mean to make religious sources, rather than democratic civil principles, a reference for security priorities? Is reducing the rights of Arab citizens, who constitute about a fifth of citizens, consistent with defining the state as Jewish and democratic? What is the impact of the erosion of equality and secular liberal identity on its international standing?

2. Peace is a transitional stage or a strategic goal?

Traditional doctrine considers peace a pillar of prosperity, foreign relations, and international standing.

What is the strategic and moral cost of considering peace agreements as inherently suspect, rather than strategic assets that should be preserved? Doesn't assuming that peace is temporary become a self-fulfilling prophecy that harms Israel's long-term security? How can migration and the drain of talent resulting from this path be confronted?

3. Building between wars or permanent war?

The traditional vision is based on state building during periods of calm, and on considering war as a short exception in which the resources accumulated during stability are consumed.

What happens to society, economy and culture when constant war becomes the norm? Can the country develop and prosper under it?

4. Deterrence and warning or continuous preventive war?

Traditional doctrine combined deterrence and early warning to manage risks without the constant use of force.

What does it mean to abandon deterrence, warning, then defense, and the principle that says: “Even if we are surprised, we will not be defeated”? Is it possible to build a strategy that abandons risk management? Does a permanent offensive initiative make Israel safer? What is its economic and social cost?

5. Soldiers in front of civilians or civilians the first line of defense?

After the establishment of the army, the principle was that soldiers should bear the burden of defense on the first line, and that civilian lives should be protected and their exposure to combat reduced. The army protects the farmer who plows his land, and it is not the farmer or his plow that protects the borders.

Doesn’t using the population of settlements and outposts as a “shield” reverse this priority and expose non-combatants to danger? What does it mean to abandon legal borders in favor of flexible and indefinite defense zones? What is its security, economic and international cost?

6. International support or complete security and economic sufficiency?

Given Israel's small size, limited resources, and dependence on global trade, science, and technology, the security establishment realized its need for the support of a superpower, and its inability to establish a self-sufficient security economy isolated from the world.

Is an interest-based trade relationship with the United States sufficient? Is breaking away from international scientific and industrial cooperation economically possible, or does it threaten technological stagnation and diplomatic isolation?

Conclusion

Heyman argues that the new doctrine, while not officially adopted, has been guiding central aspects of security policy since October 7th. Because it works in practice, defining it and subjecting it to public debate are crucial to distinguishing between a necessary security adjustment and a fundamental, uncontrolled shift in the state's identity.

Comment

The importance of the paper is that Heyman moves the question from: How do you fight Israel? To: What country does Israel become through its method of war? The ongoing war, settlement expansion, marginalization of equality, and rejection of settlement do not have separate military options; These are elements that can come together to change the nature of the state and its goals.

He does not object to the necessity of drawing lessons from October 7th, but rather objects to turning failure into a justification for rejecting peace, defense, warning, and risk management together. The failure to implement a security doctrine does not prove that all of its principles are invalid, nor does it make permanent war a sustainable alternative.

But the paper should be read as a critical diagnosis and an intentional intellectual provocation. The writer himself describes his conclusion as theoretical self-reflection. The text alone does not provide detailed evidence proving that all ten principles have become a unified doctrine adopted by the entire government and security establishment. Some of it may be an ideology of influential forces, some of it is field practice, and some of it is a trend that has not yet been completed.

For the Palestinians, the eighth and ninth principles are the most dangerous. They combine denying the authenticity of the Palestinian national movement, rejecting statehood and secession, expanding settlement, and granting Palestinians rights of residency and local administration. This, if established as a permanent policy, would mean replacing Palestinian self-determination with population management within a space controlled by Israel, separating residency from equal citizenship and sovereignty.

Considering settlement as a security tool also creates a recurring cycle of expansion: establishing outposts that require military protection, then expanding the protection areas, then using the need for security to justify an additional presence. Here the borders become mobile, and it is difficult to determine the moment at which the military mission ends.

However, Heyman's defense of traditional identity is based on a normative reading of the Declaration of Independence. Comparison between the declared founding principles and current practice alone is not sufficient to evaluate Israeli history towards the Palestinians. Therefore, it is possible to benefit from his criticism of the current transformation, without accepting that the previous stage had already achieved the equality and peace that he invokes. Heyman's paper exposes the tension between the ambition of regional partnership and the doctrine he describes: a state that is skeptical of peace, approves of weakening its neighbors, and rejects Palestinian national rights will find it difficult to build sustainable partnerships, even if others need its military capabilities temporarily.

Its basic message to the Israeli decision-maker is: It is not enough to increase fighting capacity; It must determine which political and social life it wants to protect, and to what political end the use of force leads. Its message to the Palestinians is that the ongoing conflict may go beyond the terms of the settlement to an attempt to eliminate its basis: recognition of the existence of a Palestinian people with the right to sovereignty and self-determination.

In conclusion, I argue that we, as Palestinians, especially the Palestinian security services and the security thinking institutions associated with them, should provide the Palestinians and Arabs with a reading of the Israeli security doctrine that has become clear not only in Israeli security behavior after October 7, but is also being expressed in the writings and publications of the Israeli security thinking institutions close to the right-wing coalition that now rules Israel, especially the Misgav and Jerusalem Institutes for Security and Strategy, and based on this reading, we should present proposals for principles. On which the Palestinian national identity and the beliefs and policies that are founded must be based, instead of spending effort, money and time on other issues that are far from what concerns the Palestinian future.