Three years after October 7: Has faith in peace or confidence in the possibility of achieving it declined?

Writer: Dr. Nabil Koukali

Three years after October 7, 2023, a question arises that goes beyond determining the victor and the loser: Have the Palestinians and Israelis become closer to peace, or has the war deepened doubts about the possibility of achieving it? Does the decline in belief in the chances of peace mean that people no longer want it, or do they still aspire to it but doubt the conditions, leadership and guarantees capable of turning it into reality?

Dr. Nabil Kokali

This question does not relate to political positions alone, but rather to the future of societies that have endured enormous humanitarian, economic, and security losses. The results of a recent Palestinian Opinion Center (PCPO) survey provide insight into the gap between peace as a desirable goal and peace as an achievable political possibility.

Three years later: What do the Palestinians say about peace?

The Palestinian Opinion Poll Center (PCPO) conducted a survey during the period from 1 to 18 October 2026, which included 442 Palestinian men and women aged 18 years and over, distributed among 273 participants in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem (61.8%), and 169 participants in the Gaza Strip (38.2%). The interviews were carried out using Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing (CATI) and Random Digit Dial (RDD) and the reported response rate was 61%, with a reference statistical margin of error of ±4.66 percentage points at a 95% confidence level, assuming simple random sampling.

When participants were asked about the change in their belief in the possibility of peace compared to their positions before October 7, 2023, 53.6% reported that they had become less confident in the possibility of achieving it, compared to 26.7% who said that their belief had increased, while 17.6% stated that their position had not changed.

But the picture becomes more complex when moving from expectations of peace to the future preferred by citizens. 91% believed that the continuation of the conflict would harm the Palestinian people and their interests to varying degrees, including 84.2% who considered that the harm was very great. At the same time, 66.5% preferred a final peace agreement that would end the conflict, and 16.1% preferred an interim political solution that would later lead to a final agreement, compared to 4.8% who chose to continue the confrontation until political circumstances changed.

The results indicate the need to distinguish between three concepts: the desire for peace, the belief in the possibility of achieving it, and confidence in the implementation of any agreement. A citizen may prefer a political solution, even when he does not see the conditions necessary to achieve it.

It is methodologically important that the comparison question to before October 2023 measures the change that participants describe based on their memory, and does not alone prove that the war was the direct cause of the change in their attitudes.

The West Bank and the Gaza Strip: differences worth explaining

The results reveal differences between participants in the two regions. 56.1% of participants in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, reported a decline in their belief in the possibility of peace, compared to 49.7% in the Gaza Strip. On the other hand, 33.7% in Gaza said that their faith had increased, compared to 22.3% in the West Bank.

When asked about the preferred future, 72.8% of participants in Gaza chose a final peace agreement, compared to 62.6% in the West Bank. Also, 89.9% in Gaza believed that the continuation of the conflict harms Palestinian interests to a very great extent, compared to 80.6% in the West Bank.

These differences do not necessarily mean that Gazans are more optimistic about the possibility of peace, but they may reflect different experiences and circumstances between the two regions. The rise in preference for a final agreement in Gaza may be linked to the humanitarian and economic toll and the desire to avoid a new war and restore normalcy. On the other hand, the decline in faith in the possibility of peace in the West Bank may be linked to the continuation of settlements, restrictions on movement, and the deterioration of the political and security conditions.

This reading suggests that suffering may enhance the desire to end conflict without necessarily increasing confidence in the possibility of achieving peace, a possible explanation for which the data do not demonstrate a direct causal relationship.

Crisis of confidence: What does the comparison with the Israelis reveal?

The results gain importance when placed in the context of opinion polls on both sides.

A poll published by the Pew Research Center on September 15, 2026 showed that 17% of Israelis and 21% of Palestinians in the West Bank and East Jerusalem saw that peaceful coexistence between Israel and an independent Palestinian state was possible, compared to 56% and 68%, respectively, who considered it not possible.

In a previous poll published by Pew on June 3, 2025, 75% of Israelis described distrust as a major obstacle to peace, and 52% considered Israeli settlements in the West Bank a major obstacle.

As for the 2026 PCPO survey, it showed that 83.7% of Palestinian participants considered lack of trust a major obstacle, and 86.7% described the settlements as a major obstacle.

An important analytical issue arises here: the crisis of confidence is present on both sides, but that does not mean that they agree on its causes or are responsible for it. Also, the 2026 Pew poll did not include Gaza, unlike the PCPO poll, which requires caution when comparing.

These findings suggest that the problem is not only about the desire for peace, but also about the extent to which people are convinced that rights, security, and political obligations can be guaranteed and implemented.

What did the Palestinians say about the results of the war?

This reading reinforces the results of two previous surveys conducted by PCPO in 2025.

In a poll conducted in the Gaza Strip between October 8 and 12, 2025, and included 301 adults, 71.1% believed that there was no clear victor and that both sides lost, compared to 11.3% who considered Israel victorious, and 11% who chose Hamas.

In a separate question, 64.1% linked their assessment to destruction and human suffering without achieving real political gains. When determining priorities, 41.5% chose reconstruction, 20.3% chose humanitarian aid and protection of civilians, and 13% chose national unity.

In another poll conducted in the West Bank and Gaza Strip between September 28 and October 3, 2025, and included 304 participants, 87.5% supported a comprehensive ceasefire, and 68.4% supported the gradual Israeli withdrawal.

The two surveys used CATI and RDD, and the differences in samples and questions do not allow the results of 2025 and 2026 to be considered a direct time series, but they help to understand the priorities of participants in different circumstances.

Between narratives of victory and political results

The Israeli narrative is based on what the government and army announced about weakening the military capabilities of their opponents and enhancing deterrence, while Hamas presents its continued presence as evidence of steadfastness.

In this context, the Israeli army spokeswoman for the Arab media, Ella Wawiya, in an article published by the Elaph website on October 12, 2026, presented what she described as Israeli military achievements, noting that about 100,000 targets were targeted on multiple fronts, according to the Israeli military narrative. This reference clarifies the scale of the operations as presented by the Israeli army, but it does not alone determine their political and security consequences.

However, the scale of military operations alone does not prove the achievement of sustainable security, and the continued presence of Hamas does not answer questions about the future of Gaza, governance, reconstruction, and Palestinian rights.

Here, a distinction must be made between military results and political results. Field goals may be achieved without turning into long-term security or an acceptable settlement. Likewise, the continuation of one party in the confrontation does not necessarily prove the achievement of national gains commensurate with the losses.

War decisions and the humanitarian and economic costs

The events of October 7 did not begin in a vacuum, but rather came in the context of a long conflict in which political and security crises accumulated and the prospects for a settlement were blocked. But understanding the context does not absolve parties of responsibility to review their decisions and outcomes.

The October 7 attacks included targeting civilians and taking hostages, and were followed by a massive Israeli war on Gaza that left human losses and massive destruction. Human Rights Watch in July 2024, and the United Nations Independent International Commission of Inquiry in June 2024, documented grave violations against civilians.

According to Reuters in October 2026, the 2023 attacks resulted in the deaths of about 1,200 people in Israel and the taking of 251 hostages, while the number of Palestinian deaths in Gaza exceeded 74,000.

Behind these numbers are families who lost their children, children who were deprived of education, and displaced people who lost their homes and sources of livelihood. Economically, Israel bore significant financial and military burdens, while Gaza faced widespread destruction of infrastructure, housing, and economic activities.

Reviewing Hamas's decisions does not mean ignoring Palestinian rights or the context that preceded the war, nor does holding accountable Israeli decisions mean ignoring Israeli security concerns. The protection of civilians and respect for international humanitarian law remain basic criteria for evaluating the behavior of all parties.

Arms, withdrawal and reconstruction: what should change?

Despite a ceasefire in October 2025, the issues of Hamas weapons, Israeli withdrawal, reconstruction, and security arrangements remain unresolved.

The disagreements over the arrangement of commitments reveal a crisis that goes beyond military measures to trust in political guarantees. Overcoming them requires clear arrangements, independent verification mechanisms, and an implementable timetable.

The future of Palestinian security institutions requires addressing the issue of who is authorized to use force within a clear institutional and political framework. Reconstruction requires responsible Palestinian administration, transparent oversight, and guaranteed access to resources and aid.

These files cannot be separated from ending the Palestinian division and renewing the legitimacy of institutions, or from the need for a political path that addresses Palestinian national rights and Israeli security concerns.

Realizing the cost of continuing conflict does not automatically translate into confidence in peace, but rather requires concrete actions that make agreements enforceable and accountable.

Conclusion: From the desire for peace to the ability to achieve it

Three years after October 7, each side can continue to present its narrative of achievement or resilience. But the Palestinian and Israeli people, who have endured the repercussions of the war, need more than statements of victory. The Palestinians aspire to freedom and the realization of their national rights, rebuilding their lives and institutions, obtaining security, housing and job opportunities, and living in dignity under responsible institutions and a future that can be trusted. In return, Israelis look forward to security, stability, and ensuring that the tragedy will not be repeated. Despite the different circumstances and challenges that each people faces, they both need a future that is not governed by a cycle of fear and violence, but rather based on respect for human and national rights, mutual security, and just and sustainable peace.

The PCPO poll results, along with Pew Research Center polls, reveal a gap between the desire for peace and confidence in the possibility of achieving it, even if the positions of Palestinians and Israelis and the reasons for their fears differ. Declining belief in the possibility of peace does not necessarily mean abandoning the desire for it, and realizing the cost of continuing the conflict alone is not enough to build confidence between the two parties.

Therefore, the most important question after three years is no longer just who won and who lost, but rather what must change in order for peace to become possible, just, and implementable, and to guarantee Palestinian national rights and security for Israelis and Palestinians alike?

Wars may change the balance of power, but they do not necessarily address the causes of conflict. The real test for the political leaders on both sides lies not only in their ability to manage the war, but in their ability to prevent the next war, protect civilians, and transform human rights, security and dignity into the foundations for a more stable future for the Palestinian and Israeli peoples.