Voices from within the Iranian elite call for a referendum and a review of the governance structure

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At a time when Iran is facing increasing military, economic, and political pressures, striking statements have emerged in recent days by three Iranian political figures, Ali Jannati, Mostafa Kawakabian, and Gholamhossein Karbasji, calling for a review of the method of running the state, restoring respect to the will of the citizens, and avoiding the continuation of the confrontation with the United States without an accurate calculation of its costs.

These statements gain their importance from their coincidence with the escalation of the debate about the future of the Iranian political system, especially since the demands presented are not limited to changing government policies, but rather extend to calling for a referendum on changes to the structure of the system, reviewing the constitution, and reconsidering the relationship between power and society.

These positions raise questions about whether they reflect the widening disagreement within the Iranian political elite over the management of the current stage, or whether they represent attempts to reform the regime from within before its crises worsen.

In an interview published by the Iranian newspaper "Etemad", and the contents of which were republished by the "Asr Iran" website, Ali Jannati, the former Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance and former diplomat, called for a review of the foundations of state administration, stressing that the starting point must be a return to the spirit and texts of the constitution.

Jannati stressed the need to restore respect to the basic rights of citizens, individual and social freedoms, and popular oversight, considering that important parts of the constitution have been marginalized over the past decades.

He also called for reviewing the constitution itself, and taking advantage of the referendum mechanisms stipulated in Article 59, especially on major political, economic and international issues that affect the country’s future.

He stressed that the authority is required to listen to society and rely on the opinions of citizens and independent experts in formulating policies, instead of making strategic decisions without taking into account the demands of the majority.

Jannati's positions were not limited to constitutional reform, but also addressed the repercussions of war, the naval blockade, and economic challenges, warning that continued attrition may push Iran to face greater internal and regional pressures, and reduce its ability to protect its interests.

These statements gain additional political significance given that Jannati is the son of Ahmed Jannati, a prominent conservative figure whose name is linked to the Guardian Council. However, family connection alone is not enough to conclude that Ali Jannati’s position reflects a division within the institutions represented by his father.

He also strongly criticized the massacres committed in the protests, saying that 80% of those killed were under 18 years of age, and this is considered the first acknowledgment that the dead were young Iranians ambitious for life and the future, and not, as some hard-liners promoted, that it was a plan for a coup against the government or something similar.

For his part, Mustafa Kawakbian, a former deputy in the Islamic Shura Council, called for holding a referendum as soon as possible on changes to the structure of the system.

The invitation published by the "Baytotah" website, citing statements made by Kawakibian to the "Iran 24" website, was accompanied by criticism of the lack of clarity in the status of the presidency of the Iranian Radio and Television Corporation, and calls to provide a wider space for different political opinions in the official media.

Kawakibian stressed the importance of dialogue between reformists and conservatives, and benefiting from political figures with different orientations in discussing national issues.

The importance of this call goes beyond the demand to reform the performance of a specific institution, as presenting a referendum on the structure of the system opens, in principle, the door to discussion about the nature of the required institutional changes, the limits of powers, and the mechanisms for making major decisions.

However, in the published statements, Kawakibian did not specify in detail what changes should be put to a referendum, which makes it necessary to distinguish between the demand to hold a referendum and the existence of an integrated project to change the political system.

As for Gholamhossein Karbasji, former Secretary-General of the Construction Cadres Party and former mayor of Tehran, he focused his statements on the economic and social cost of the continuation of the war, criticizing the rhetoric that exaggerates the damage to the United States compared to the losses that Iran bears.

He said, during his participation in the television program “It Has Time Iran” on the Iranian Radio and Television Corporation, that the damage caused to America cannot be compared to the losses suffered by Iran and its people, stressing the need to conduct a realistic assessment of the balance of power.

He also called for restoring citizens' confidence, and criticized the continued internal pressures and arrests, considering that the government cannot guarantee the cohesion of society if it ignores his demands.

Karbasji also warned against expanding the circle of regional confrontation, calling for not directing missiles towards Kuwait, Bahrain and the Emirates so that the countries of the region do not turn into parties aligned against Iran.

In the same context, he stressed the need to end the state of war and uncertainty through negotiation and reaching an agreement instead of continuing attrition.

These positions reveal an approach that focuses on the relationship between national security, popular satisfaction, and economic capacity, and believes that continuing confrontation without a political settlement may weaken the state’s ability to contain internal crises.

Despite the different political backgrounds of the three figures, their statements intersect on three main issues.

First, there is a need to restore popular satisfaction as one of the conditions for national stability, and not be satisfied with military capabilities or ideological discourse to ensure the cohesion of society.

Secondly, reviewing the method of making strategic decisions, whether through referendum, amending laws and the constitution, or expanding the space for political dialogue.

Third, re-evaluating the cost of the external confrontation, in light of the economic risks, social burdens, and the possibility of harming Iran’s relations with the countries of the region.

This intersection indicates a widening space for debate regarding the feasibility of the existing approach, but it does not necessarily mean that these figures form a unified political wing or that they adopt a common goal to change the regime.

Some analysts of Iranian affairs, such as researcher and writer Arif Nasr, believe that these positions can be read as indicators of the existence of disagreements regarding the administration of the state, but proving the existence of a rift in the current circle of government requires additional evidence, such as the emergence of declared disagreements between the security institutions and the political leadership, the transformation of reform calls into official decisions, or the occurrence of rifts between figures who possess actual executive influence. These rifts may occur if the sea, land and air blockade continues and the Iranian internal situation explodes.

These calls are an attempt to save the regime by amending some of its policies, not as a prelude to ending it

Arif Nasr added to Al-Arabiya.net and Al-Hadath.net, “The importance of Ali Jannati and Kawakibian’s statements lies in moving the discussion to issues related to the constitution, the referendum, and the structure of the system, instead of being limited to criticizing the government’s performance. As for Karbasji’s statements, they highlight the economic and social aspect of the crisis, and raise questions about the state’s ability to continue the confrontation without a political settlement.”

Arif Nasr stressed that there is another possibility that is no less important, “which is that these calls are an attempt to save the regime by amending some of its policies, not a preparation for ending it. Demanding reform from within institutions does not necessarily mean adopting a radical change in the nature of the regime.”

Many observers of Iranian affairs believe that the continued economic and military pressures, and the inability to reach an external settlement, may lead to increasing demands within the elite to reconsider the strategy followed, and this may lead to broader negotiations, limited political reforms, or a more serious constitutional debate.

On the other hand, the authority may choose to tighten its security grip if it considers that political concessions threaten its cohesion. The continuation of disputes does not automatically mean that the institutions that possess the tools of power and implementation will accept the redistribution of powers.

Therefore, the most important indicator is not the number of figures demanding reform, but rather the extent of decision-making centers’ willingness to transform these demands into actual measures, and the extent of society’s ability to impose its issues within the political sphere. Therefore, the statements of Ali Jannati, Mostafa Kawakabian, and Gholamhossein Karbasji reveal a growing debate within the Iranian political arena regarding the relationship between the survival of the regime and the continuation of current policies.

Jannati’s call for a constitutional and institutional review that restores the role of citizens in decision-making, Kawakibian’s demand for a referendum on changes to the structure of the regime, and Karbasji’s focus on the need to stop attrition, restore the people’s satisfaction, and avoid expanding the regional confrontation, if they indicate anything, they indicate the emergence of a conviction among large groups within the political elite that it is not possible to continue with this style of governance and ideological discourse that is not in line with global and regional changes at the current stage, especially after the events of the forty-day war and its effects on the interior. Iranian.

The importance of issuing such positions lies in the fact that they did not come from reformists such as Sayyed Mohammad Khatami, reformist theorist Mostafa Tajzadeh, or leaders of the Green Movement such as Mir Hossein Mousavi, who had previously called for change through a referendum on the constitution and the system in a smooth manner, but it came from figures who were and still are affiliated with the current political system.

The most prominent and fundamental question that arises remains: Did American pressures lead to this change in positions that may turn into political and institutional pressure that imposes a broader review to change the rules of governance in Iran from within Iran, or will these calls remain voices demanding a theoretical correction of the course without a practical translation?