The New Assassins: From the Kaaba courtyard to Riyadh Airport

Searching for a false media victory for the Houthi militia at the expense of innocent people by attacking King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh is a despicable method that exposes the doctrine and approach of the new Assassins. The airport is not just a building, but a place where travelers, workers, families and patients seeking treatment gather. The recent attacks on this civilian facility, and the reported casualties, have once again demonstrated the humanitarian cost of this escalation. Their blood does not become a military achievement because a propaganda statement called it that, nor does the life of a traveler become less sacred because the organization wants to impose its message by force. Targeting civilians may be an attempt to compensate for the field failure with a media shock, or to impose pressure by terrorizing the population, but that does not justify underestimating the militia’s ability to commit treachery. Seriousness in confronting its treachery begins with understanding it and protecting people from it. It is not correct to interpret this confrontation as an inevitable war between sects; The real danger lies in the cross-border revolutionary project that sees its Arab and Islamic surroundings as an arena of influence rather than a respected neighborhood. Therefore, it has only known the language of clashes, from Iraq to Syria to Lebanon to Yemen, and wherever its arms extend, devastation and division have ensued. Countries and organizations are held accountable for their policies and actions, not for the identities of millions of people. The most dangerous thing that extremist groups do is to drag societies into their sectarian logic until everyone becomes prisoners of classification and hostility. The strongest position is the one that rejects the Houthi project and condemns the interference of the Iranian regime, while at the same time preserving the principle of citizenship, the sanctity of blood, and justice among people.

When esoteric doctrine turns into a tool for seizing power, and weapons become a means of subjugating society, and the blood of innocents is shed in the service of a political project, then we are faced with an organization that sees the state as a spoil, the citizen as fuel, and the homeland as an arena for settling the scores of others. From this perspective, the Houthi experience in Yemen is read: an armed underground movement that imposed its authority by force, was linked to a regional project, and made threatening the neighborhood and targeting civilians a means of pressure and bargaining. Describing them as “new Assassins” is not a claim of direct organizational extension between groups separated by centuries, but rather a description of a recurring approach: intimidation, treachery, and the use of superstition in battles for power.

Islamic history has known organizations that used superstitious claims in the struggle for power, and their experiences and methods varied, but some of them left unforgettable wounds. One of the darkest of these pages is what the Qarmatians did in the year 317 AH when they stormed the Sacred Mosque during the Hajj season, killing the pilgrims in the courtyard of the Kaaba, and throwing the bodies of the dead into the Zamzam Well, as history books narrate, and they uprooted the Black Stone and carried it to Hajar, where it remained absent from its place for about twenty-two years until it was returned in the year 339 AH. Bringing up this crime is not to hold the followers of a contemporary sect accountable for the burdens of history, but rather a reminder that the mentality that permits sacred blood in the name of superstition, and grants itself immunity from criticism and accountability, returns whenever it finds a weapon or a cover. In the Yemeni case, the Houthis’ takeover of state institutions was not a political dispute that could be settled by changing a government or amending a program, but rather it was a coup that replaced the authority of the state with the authority of an armed group. Their alliance with former President Ali Abdullah Saleh and the forces loyal to him contributed to enabling them to control Sanaa in September 2014, and to benefit from the army’s capabilities and stores. In its resolution 2216, the Security Council demanded their withdrawal from the areas they had seized, and the handover of the weapons they had seized from the military and security institutions, but the group continued on its path, and its alliance with Saleh ended with his killing at its hands in December 2017. Thus, the tragedy did not begin in a vacuum, but rather from an alliance of interests that presented calculations of control and revenge over the future of the Yemenis. The movement arose in a poor and marginal Zaidi environment, and its founders are attributed to the deviant Jaudi movement, and then it was influenced in its discourse. political and mobilization based on the Iranian ideological and revolutionary model,Until its slogans and literature became an echo of Tehran’s discourse. The most accurate criticism is to focus on its authoritarian project, its use of religious identity in mobilization, and its claim to monopolize the representation of society. Zaidi is not synonymous with the Houthis, and the Yemenis who belong to it are not a single bloc, and many of them are victims of this group before others. The battle to restore the state must unite citizens around equality, and prevent any organization from converting lineage or sectarian affiliation into a privilege in governance or a right to subjugate others. As for external support, it is the key to understanding the expansion of the group’s capabilities. Reports by United Nations experts documented the weapons, expertise and training the Houthis received from Iran and Hezbollah, which contributed to transforming them from a local force into an organization that launches missiles and drones at targets outside Yemen. The funding did not stop there, as the group imposed levies in the name of zakat, in addition to the fifth it receives from its sympathizers outside Yemen. These levies have sparked widespread criticism for the privileges they grant to certain groups at the expense of other Yemenis, in a country exhausted by poverty and where salaries and services have been disrupted. The problem here is not people's beliefs or worship, but rather the use of armed authority to distribute resources on grounds that do not achieve equality. External support does not absolve the group’s leadership from responsibility. Whoever accepts to turn his country into a platform to serve his allies bears the consequences of his choice, no matter how much he takes shelter in the rhetoric of resistance or claims to defend sovereignty. Iran initially found in the fragility of the Yemeni state, and in war, poverty, and the blockage of opportunities, an environment conducive to expanding its influence, so it used Al-Houthi as a tool for its project. This does not detract from the awareness of the Yemenis.Rather, it is a description of what armed organizations do when they monopolize education, media, and resources, making need a gateway to recruitment and subjugation, until children are taken to the front lines, and curricula are changed to serve the group’s ideology. In the declared Iranian discourse, the slogans of “supporting the oppressed,” “the axis of resistance,” and “exporting the revolution” are present, which Tehran has raised since 1979. As for what is behind the slogans, this support can be read as an effort to expand regional influence, threaten the security of the Kingdom from its southern flank, gain pressure cards near Bab al-Mandab and other sea lanes, and keep opponents preoccupied with multiple threats that raise the cost of any confrontation with Iran. In all of this, the Yemenis pay the greatest price for their security, their economy, and the future of their children. This approach reaches its ugliest forms when it targets civilians and the facilities that serve their daily lives, but it collides with a state that is too large to be affected by the threats of unrestrained mountain gangs, with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’s well-established institutions, capabilities, and political and economic depth. Throughout its history, the Kingdom has faced enormous terrorist challenges at home, and wars and conspiracies from abroad: from Abdel Nasser’s threats, to the 1979 sedition of the Holy Mosque, the intimidation of pilgrims, the bombings planned by Iranian arms in Mecca, Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait, and the wave of terrorism that struck the country at the beginning of the millennium, all the way to Iranian missiles and drones and Houthi projectiles. It overcame all of them with the firmness of the state. People's awareness and leadership cohesion with citizens. The Houthi file is no exception. The Kingdom deals with it with the mind of the state, not with the emotions of the gang, and with a long breath, constant vigilance, and the development of protection systems.It continues to develop and build its future despite all attempts to spread fear and disrupt its interests. As for the end of the Houthi project, its path passes through the people of Yemen themselves, under the leadership of their legitimate government when it unites its ranks and builds institutions that enjoy the trust of citizens, and with the support of the Kingdom, which combines political and military support, development, relief, and administration reform. The Yemeni who has experienced the bitterness of starvation, the theft of salaries, the recruitment of children, and the suppression of freedoms needs an alternative that guarantees him security, salary, service, and dignity, and gives him a voice in his country’s future. The more this alternative succeeds in presenting a just and effective state, the less the group’s ability to monopolize the public sphere and convince people that its armed authority is an unchanging destiny. Saudi wisdom, patience and steadfastness, with God’s help and success, then uniting the Yemeni ranks, building state institutions, and drying up sources of weapons and funding, are capable of undermining the Houthi-Iranian illusion: the illusion that missiles grant legitimacy, that control by force creates a stable state, and that external support replaces the satisfaction of citizens. As for the organization that uses the blood of civilians as a material for its propaganda, it reveals in itself the bankruptcy of its moral and political project, and is paving the way to its end with its own hands. May God have mercy on the martyrs, heal the injured, comfort the hearts of their families, cherish our country, preserve its leadership, its people, and those residing on its land, preserve Yemen and its people, and help it restore its state and sovereignty.