The awaited war in Iran... ambitious goals and greater obstacles

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In recent days, the world has lived under indications of a major event and dangerous repercussions, whether before or after the midterm elections in the United States. War, as an idea to resolve the conflict with Iran with the aim of making it submit to America's conditions, is strongly rooted in the doctrine of President Donald Trump, who insists that his special political skills make him the best person to establish deals that provide unlimited resources exclusively to the United States.

When war is planned, goals are set for it. limited or substantial. In the American-Iranian case, and as President Trump has emphasized several times, there are a number of reasonable and unreasonable goals: Iran not possessing any nuclear weapons, weakening the regime so that it accepts American conditions for a settlement later, overthrowing the regime completely without clarifying what the alternative regime is acceptable to America, getting rid of its hardline leaders, opening the Strait of Hormuz to international navigation without any obstacles, isolating Iran from its allies spread across a number of Arab countries, and distinguished oil deals for partners. Americans, as is the case with the post-Maduro regime in Venezuela.

A long list of goals that changes from one week to the next means that there is strategic confusion among the White House in dealing with Iran, whether through war or through negotiations. If we integrate the Israeli factor into the American strategic calculations, which Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu insists on and is pursuing with President Trump, the goal of toppling the regime and destroying all of Iran’s nuclear capabilities emerges. It is important to note two overlapping things; The first relates to the Israeli promotion of the goal of overthrowing the Iranian regime, as it is now in its weakest state, but the extremists are controlling the decision, and according to Netanyahu, they are planning to speed up the nuclear bomb system, which, if they possess it, will mean destruction for Israel, and therefore the regime must be overthrown before the catastrophe occurs, according to his propaganda system. The other observation relates to the focus on the concept of pre-emptive war, as in the statements of Israeli Defense Minister Yisrael Katz, as if he were considering waging war without any hesitation as a safe haven for Israel’s survival. It is a war that Israel launches according to its assessments regarding major risks that must be averted first, whether these risks are supported by actual facts on the ground, or merely speculation and theoretical conclusions. The two observations are intertwined and embody the method of promoting waging war regardless of American reservations.

However, American reservations have their strength and influence, not on the decision to go to war and destroy Iran, its nuclear capabilities, and the Iranian infrastructure, but on the timing of the war, and here are three theoretical timings, the first of which is before the Israeli elections and this timing seems to have limited luck, and the second is before the American elections and seems laden with complications and uncalculated consequences such as a massive rise in oil prices, and thus may bring a greater decline in the chances of Republican candidates. Therefore it is excluded. The third timing, which is more fortunate than the previous ones, means waging war between Israel and America after the midterm elections. It also means that there is a very precise opportunity for the mediators to be active and all the forces and countries that are likely to be harmed the most to give consideration once again to the negotiations. This opportunity exists, but it is not without bitter obstacles.

Iran, in turn, is treating the war as a foregone conclusion, and hopes that the mediators will succeed in convincing President Trump that settlement and mutual concessions are the best option for both sides. It is prepared to deal with the nuclear file with some flexibility without losing the 60 percent enriched nuclear stock. This matter does not satisfy President Trump nor the Prime Minister of Israel. This is a major complex, and may reflect the multiplicity of decision-making centers in Tehran, and with the absence of Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei from running the country, the chances of war seem greater. Here, Iran is betting on three things. The first is that it has, as it says, more lethal weapons than it has used before, and that it will have a greater impact on the American forces and their allies. The second is the threat to the global communications system. Seven data transmission lines pass between East and West down the Strait of Hormuz, and according to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, it is easy to cut those lines, or some of them, and plunge the world into a major crisis related to communications, data centers, banks, airlines, and infrastructure in many countries. It is noteworthy that repairing a communications line after it has been damaged requires precise technical interventions and a completely safe environment. This is what the Revolutionary Guard sources confirm that they will not allow.

The third issue in Iranian discourse focuses on the ability of society and institutions to absorb shocks, regardless of their strength and severity. This dimension embodies an implicit realization that the anticipated war will lead to very large losses, but will not topple the regime, and thus one of the most important and largest justifications for the war for both Washington and Tel Aviv will collapse. Iranian rhetoric does not hide its ability to direct harm to other powers in the regional environment, as it motivates many to pressure Washington to abandon the option of war.

This map of political, strategic and propaganda positions and equations places the war, if it occurs, in a model of its own. It will bring some benefits to the parties involved, but they remain less than what is promoted in propaganda. If decision-makers in Washington realize that this war has much greater material, humanitarian, economic and strategic costs than what is actually expected to be achieved, perhaps the calculations will change and appear more rational.

Quoted from Asharq Al-Awsat