The empire will strike again

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Never in the history of US-Israeli relations has an American president announced his support for a candidate in an Israeli election, until Trump did so last Sunday, nine days before the October 27 elections. His declaration was clear and could not be interpreted. He wrote that if Israel put anyone other than Netanyahu at the head of its government, America would have to carry out the mission in Iran itself, and he was unwilling to do that. The next day, he commented publicly that he needed Netanyahu to complete the mission in Iran, and that he did not like America to do it alone.

Perhaps the reader will ask about the title. I borrowed it from the second film in the “Star Wars” series, in which the Empire, after its opponents thought it was in decline, strikes again. The empire here is America. We have recently been told that it is withdrawing from the region and recalculating its burdens, and here its president is publicly declaring his need for a partner with whom to reopen the Iranian file.

I wrote weeks ago that Washington can influence but cannot choose, and that all evidence indicated that Netanyahu is no longer Trump's first choice. He refrained from supporting it for months, pushed for a ceasefire with Iran and with Hezbollah in Lebanon despite Israel's objection, and admitted that he described Netanyahu in a private conversation as crazy because of what happened in Lebanon. There were reports that some of his closest advisors believed that his agenda in the region would proceed better if the government in Israel changed. Then came the support, and Trump told the American website Axios that he had always intended to do so, and that he did not want to do it too early. This is a statement that is difficult to reconcile with months of abstinence, and is not sufficient to explain what happened.

What has changed, in my opinion, is not Trump’s opinion of Netanyahu, but rather his need for him. Support cannot be understood from the perspective of elections. Trump's popularity today is lower than it was, his speech has a weaker impact on the Israeli voter, and support for Israel no longer carries the weight in the American electoral balance that it did before. If the motivation is neither the Israeli voter nor the American voter, what remains? What Trump himself said remains, which is Iran.

According to Axios, Trump and Netanyahu discussed about two weeks ago the possibility of launching a new major operation against Iran before the elections in the two countries. Trump was initially inclined to accept, then he hesitated and decided to wait until later. At the conclusion of his support, he wrote that they would finish the mission soon, and Netanyahu responded that they would complete the mission together. This is the language of someone who has unfinished business and wants to keep the door open for resumption, with a partner who he believes is most prepared for that.

However, support, as strange as it is, does not guarantee anything. Most recent polls place Netanyahu's coalition below the minimum required to form a government, which is sixty-one seats. The Israeli Channel 12 poll, which is considered closer to the center and more critical of Netanyahu, gave the coalition forty-nine seats, in which Eisenkot was ahead of Netanyahu in voters’ preference for prime minister by forty-five percent versus thirty-five. Only the poll of the Israeli Channel 14, which is openly supportive of Netanyahu, gave the coalition a majority, in which the majority was exactly the minimum. The average poll was about fifty-four seats for the Netanyahu bloc, compared to forty-nine for the Zionist opposition. Commenting on the support, Eisenkot said that the elections are an internal matter, and that only the citizens of Israel are the ones who decide. This is exactly what I mean: Washington can support, but it cannot choose.

The issue has another aspect related to the Abrahamic Agreements. Israel's participation in the strike on Iran, if it occurs, may increase its credit with the Gulf states that were affected by the Iranian strikes, and provide them with a partner who alleviates this danger instead of appearing to be a burden on them. This is a perception, not a certainty, as public opinion in the region may see it differently, but it explains why Trump can see the war as a door to expanding the scope of these agreements, not an obstacle in the way.

As for whether the strike will actually occur, this is what no one can answer today. All that can be said is that after the elections, Trump and Netanyahu have several possibilities. The first of which is for Israel to launch a new major strike on Iran with American cover and intelligence and logistical support, which is what the phrase: “We will finish the mission soon” suggests. The second is for America itself to participate in the strike, as it did in the first war, which is what Trump says he is not inclined to do, but he may find himself forced to do it if Israel falters alone. Third, the economic pressure launched in August should continue. If it does not change Tehran’s calculations and Iran responds from the Strait of Hormuz, where it has a comparative advantage, military escalation will become the next step. Fourth, the truce and negotiations should continue, and support remains a message of pressure on Tehran and nothing more.

In exchange for these possibilities are real restrictions, the first of which is in Washington itself. The midterm elections are in about two weeks, on November 3, and if the House of Representatives moves to the opposition, and perhaps the Senate as well, a president who resumes the war will face hearings, battles over funding, and a vote on war powers. The war exhausted the global economy, and Trump did not hide his lack of patience with it. His decision to postpone the strike until after the elections is evidence that this constraint actually works.

There are restrictions on the Israeli side as well. Israel is fighting on several fronts and has been exhausted by a long war, and any Iranian response falls on its cities, and its diplomatic isolation is deep. The elections themselves are another limitation. If Netanyahu does not win, a government will come with a different agenda and months of coalition bargaining, and if he wins by a narrow margin, he will lead a fragile coalition forced to take into account its partners. It is true that Trump's words suggest that he might leave Israel the initiative, but the first war was a joint one, and returning it without American cover is much more difficult.

Thus we reach the conclusion from which we started. Trump’s support for Netanyahu shows how much he would like to control events, and at the same time shows how little he actually has control over. America may not back down at all, but rather move to a better position, leaving its partners to carry the burden, and reserving the final strike decision for itself. However, this new location is not far from the fire. An empire that wants to ease its burdens, whether we call it a retreat or a move to a better position, may be dragged forward, by the hand of its allies, by its own words, and by the choices of its opponent.

Quoted from Al-Masry Al-Youm