We should not base our strategy on the results of the Israeli elections, but...

author

D. Omar Rahal

When the Palestinians are asked to wait for the next Israeli elections, they are in effect being asked to pin their future on a decision that they do not have the right to participate in making, while policies that change the conditions of this future continue on their land. The problem is not in following the elections or analyzing their results, as this is necessary work to understand the political environment. The problem is turning it into a source of national hope, and assuming that changing the government will lead to a change in the state’s position on Palestinian rights. There is a distance between the two matters that should be filled by analysis, not wishful thinking. Hence the phrase “but” in the title of this article. We must not base our strategy on the results of the Israeli elections, but rather we must understand them, and invest in the opportunities they provide, within an independent Palestinian project in its goals, tools, and timing.

In political science, it is useful to distinguish between government as a coalition that changes, and the state as institutions, interests, and rules that persist. Israel is a political and institutional extension of the Zionist project, and is not just a government led by this or that person. Its policies towards Palestinians relate to the structure of land control, security institutions, settlement networks, and prevailing perceptions of control and identity. Therefore, the defeat of a party or the departure of a person from power does not mean, in and of itself, the dismantling of this structure. The language of government, its priorities, and the methods of exercising power may change, while the interests that protect the continuation of the occupation remain.

These interests intertwine with historical and religious narratives employed by nationalist and religious movements to present the land as an exclusive inheritance and “the land of fathers and grandfathers.” Criticism of this employment does not require the assumption that all Israelis think the same way; There are differences and movements within Israeli society, some of which are opposed to the occupation. But the political question concerns the forces capable of transforming their perceptions into legislation, budgeting, and military decisions. The difficulty of the settlement increases when the land is taken out of the realm of political negotiation and entered into the realm of absolute religious right, so that recognition of Palestinian rights becomes, in the eyes of these forces, an abandonment of part of their self-definition.

At the international level, the continuation of this structure is linked to relations of support and protection with major powers that find in Israel a partner that serves their strategic and military interests. The relationship here is based on the interaction of interests and influence, and not just a dependency relationship. This has a direct Palestinian consequence. Changing Israeli policy also needs to influence the international environment, as it makes the continuation of the occupation very costly, and it is not enough here to just wait for people to change.

The Oslo experience provides a clear example of the danger of separating the political path from the desired result. The Declaration of Principles of 1993 stipulated a transitional self-rule for a period of five years, and a permanent settlement based on Security Council Resolutions (242 and 338), and postponed the issues of Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, borders, and water to permanent status negotiations. But it did not include an explicit commitment to establishing an independent Palestinian state. This is a fundamental difference between having a negotiating process and ensuring its political outcome. Reading the text with such precision helps to understand how the transitional phase can continue until now, while the national goal on which hopes were pinned remains unachieved.

From the perspective of negotiation theory, the problem of unequal alternatives appears here. The party capable of controlling the territory and changing its facts may find it less costly to continue the status quo than to make a substantive concession. As for the party under occupation, it bears the cost of waiting, division, and deprivation daily. This is why time does not have the same value for both parties. For one of them, postponement may be an opportunity to consolidate control, and for the other, an additional loss in terms of exercising his right. When negotiations are not accompanied by stopping the changing facts and implementation and accountability mechanisms, they can turn into a cover for managing the conflict and prolonging its life.

In this context, one should read what measures a new Israeli government might offer, such as reducing barriers, opening some iron gates, returning a number of workers, removing some settlement outposts, or limiting settler attacks. These measures have a tangible value in people's lives, and it is wrong to underestimate the suffering of those waiting to reach their work, land, or hospital. But its everyday value does not automatically give it a political meaning beyond it. Opening a gate releases the confinement of a village, but it does not terminate the power of those who can close it tomorrow; Reinstating a work permit restores income, but does not achieve economic sovereignty or the right to self-determination.

The sale of illusion appears when the partial withdrawal from a restriction imposed by the occupation is re-presented as a strategic concession that requires a Palestinian return. After the restrictions are tightened, a previous level of movement and work becomes a new ceiling for ambition, and negotiations move from ending control to restoring some of what was available before it was tightened. Here, success is redefined according to a baseline created by the stronger party. What is required of the Palestinians is to achieve every possible alleviation of the suffering of citizens, while refusing to market it as an alternative to rights, or considering it as sufficient evidence of the existence of a path to end the occupation.

In Israel, there is no reliable political partner to end the occupation and realize Palestinian national rights, and there is no leadership among the Israeli forces capable of forming a government ready to sign an agreement to end the conflict on the basis of recognizing the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and establishing their independent, sovereign state. The criterion for a political partner should be its program, commitments, and ability to implement them. Moderate talk does not equate to recognizing the right to self-determination, and competing with Netanyahu does not prove the existence of a fundamental difference over Palestinian sovereignty. In July 2024, the Knesset announced its opposition to the establishment of a Palestinian state, providing an institutional indicator that goes beyond the position of a single leader. Therefore, marketing the change of government as an opportunity for peace, without a clear shift in the position on Palestinian rights, reproduces the same bet under new names. Whoever claims the existence of an Israeli partner is required to prove his readiness to end the occupation, define his obligations, and provide guarantees for their implementation; Otherwise, talk of partnership remains a cover for managing the conflict and maintaining control, not a project to end it.

Politics, contrary to the idea that it is not based on probabilities, constantly deals with uncertainty. However, scientific estimation of probabilities differs from repeating the same experiment without changing its conditions. The phrase "Let's try this time" becomes costly when the criteria for success and failure, the time period, and the alternatives available in the event of failure are absent. A serious negotiation strategy determines in advance what makes the path feasible, and what requires review. Resuming meetings is not enough if the terrain continues to change, and changing the discourse is not enough if the tools of control remain the same.

The alternative begins with restoring the Palestinian capacity for collective action. Strengthening the internal front requires addressing the division as a defect in representation and decision-making, and not just a dispute between leaders. In addition to organizational reconciliations, comprehensive political partnership, ensuring and preserving human rights and respect for public freedoms, and expanding the presence of youth, women, and societal forces. When the national decision is more representative, the chances of implementing it and withstanding pressure become greater.

On this basis, a national program can be formulated that links the ultimate goal to implementable stages: protecting the Palestinian presence on the land, confronting settlement and displacement, strengthening institutions, expanding the economic components of steadfastness, and activating political, legal, diplomatic, and peaceful popular resistance tools. The most important thing is to determine the responsibility of each party, the required resources, and indicators of progress. Supporting agriculture in threatened areas, for example, protects a family’s livelihood and enhances its ability to survive. Documenting attacks becomes a political tool when linked to legal follow-up and a specific pressure campaign, rather than remaining a record of violations.

As for Arab and international action, it requires a transition from seasonal response to organized accumulation. A political and diplomatic program can be proposed that specifies for each arena tractable demands, procedures regarding settlement, protecting citizens, reviewing forms of cooperation that contribute to the continuation of violations, and linking declared positions to executive steps. The efforts of leadership, human rights institutions, universities, and communities should be integrated within it, within a common message and a clear distribution of roles. The number of meetings and statements alone does not measure the impact of diplomacy; What it measures is the change in countries' decisions and political behavior.

International law and international legitimacy resolutions, as well as the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice issued on July 19, 2024, provide us with an important basis for this work, as it concluded that the continued Israeli presence in the occupied Palestinian territory is illegal, and that it must be ended as quickly as possible, and that states have obligations not to recognize the illegal situation and not to provide assistance in its continuation. These conclusions can be built on to formulate specific demands for governments and parliaments. But transforming the legal reference into a political effect requires follow-up, alliances, and pressure. The law clarifies commitment, while its enforcement requires continuous work.

Within this strategy, monitoring the Israeli elections is a tool for understanding opportunities and risks. If a government emerges that is more motivated towards annexation, the tools of protection and pressure will be ready. If a government is produced that offers improvements, the gains are achieved and it is forbidden to replace them with rights. If a serious political initiative emerges, it is tested according to a clear reference and implementation guarantees. In all cases, it is possible to communicate with Israeli forces that oppose the occupation on the basis of their positions and actions. Thus, Palestinian politics maintains its flexibility, without its national goal becoming dependent on the balances of a coalition that it does not control.

Basing the strategy on the Israeli elections makes the Palestinians wait for an opportunity granted by others, while embodying the national project requires building the ability to create opportunities and influence their conditions. Therefore, rejecting this bet is not a call for stagnation, but rather for a more independent and precise policy, unity based on participation, steadfastness supported by resources, diplomacy measured by its impact, and negotiation based on rights and guarantees.

Therefore, we must not base our strategy on the results of the Israeli elections, but we must change our tools and mechanisms of action, and seriously review the feasibility of methods that did not bring us closer to realizing our national rights. It is not enough to repeat the same demands and wait for a different response. What is required is to transform national unity into the ability to make and implement decisions, and diplomacy into organized action that builds alliances and increases the cost of continuing the occupation, and steadfastness into programs that protect people and the land. With this review, we reach every Israeli election better able to initiate and influence, and we measure our progress by the change we make in the conditions of the conflict and the balance of power, not by what the next government promises. Our national rights are not dependent on the change of governments, but rather their embodiment requires an independent Palestinian will, renewed tools, and cumulative action that makes bypassing them more costly than recognizing them. Therefore, the occupation will not end by changing who runs it, but rather by changing the conditions that allow it to continue, and our national mission is to make our freedom an entitlement that no Israeli government has the right to disrupt. A believer is not stung from the hole twice, unless he is persistent and addicted to delusion.