What are the specifications and capabilities we need in the members of the upcoming Palestinian Legislative Council?

Author: Dr. Nabil Koukali

What are the specifications and capabilities we need in the members of the upcoming Palestinian Legislative Council? Do those we elect possess the necessary competence, experience, and independence to truly represent us and perform the functions of parliament?

As the Palestinian legislative elections approach, it is natural for a significant part of the discussion to focus on the lists, alliances, power balances, and who might win or lose. However, there is a question that may be more important than all of that, as it begins before election day and continues for years afterward: Who are the people we want to sit in the Legislative Council, and what knowledge, experience, and capabilities should they possess to truly represent us, rather than merely occupying seats in our name?

Elections grant citizens the right to choose, but they do not alone guarantee the emergence of a council capable of legislation, oversight, and accountability. Political and social representation is important, but it does not automatically imply competence. Therefore, our concern should not be limited to conducting elections or knowing the winners, but should extend to the competence of the individuals that parties and lists present to voters, and whether they are capable of performing the roles they seek to occupy.

Here, we can cautiously benefit from the experience of local elections. In a survey conducted by the Palestinian Center for Public Opinion (PCPO) in 2026 on a sample of 412 respondents regarding municipal and village council elections, 57.7% believed that internal alliances and understandings affect the results more than competence and experience. Additionally, 62.4% indicated the existence of unannounced agreements within the lists, while 48.9% expressed a lack of confidence in the fairness of the selection mechanisms within them, and 71.2% supported implementing reforms to the electoral system. Between representation and competence.

It is methodologically inappropriate to directly apply these results to the legislative elections, as the context, questions, and nature of the institution are different. However, the lesson raised is important: winning an election does not necessarily mean that the winner is the most capable of performing public duties. This is the gap between representative legitimacy and functional legitimacy; the council may be elected and representative of the community, but its real success also depends on its ability to perform its functions efficiently between representation and competence.

This is even more important in the legislative council, as the member will not only deal with the public or an electoral base, but with laws, budgets, financial reports, ministries, economic and social policies, and with issues related to education, health, labor, agriculture, the private sector, and public freedoms. Therefore, the council needs politicians, yes, but it also needs legal, economic, and administrative knowledge, and members who can read the budget, discuss a draft law, interrogate a minister, work within a specialized committee, listen to opposing views, and build compromises when the public interest outweighs the disagreement.

This does not mean turning the parliament into a council of technical experts. The parliament is fundamentally a political and representative institution, but politics without knowledge can turn into rhetoric, and knowledge without legitimacy and representation does not create a parliament. What is required is a combination of both.

The importance of this increases when we know what citizens are actually expecting from the elections. In another survey conducted by PCPO between June 15 and 20, 2026, using computer-assisted telephone interviews and random dialing, on a sample of 300 Palestinian adults in the West Bank including Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip, 79.4% supported holding elections for the legislative council and the national council, while 71.3% stated that they intend to participate, and 75.4% expressed their willingness to accept the results even if a list they do not support wins. Palestinians and the upcoming elections...

But what is more significant is that 54.7% ranked improving economic and living conditions as the top expectation from the elections, compared to 22% for national unity and 15.3% for combating corruption and improving institutional performance. This means that citizens do not just want an elected council; they expect a council that performs its function and leaves an impact on their lives.

From here, it can be said that a member of the upcoming legislative council needs five interconnected elements: competence, integrity, independence, the ability to work with others, and knowledge of the political system.

Competence means knowing what to do and having the ability to understand issues, discuss them, and take positions on them. Integrity means viewing the parliamentary seat as a public responsibility rather than a personal privilege. Independence means being able to take a professional stance even when it does not completely align with the desires of the government or the party to which one belongs.

The ability to work with others means recognizing that the parliament is not a place to eliminate differences, but an institution for managing them through dialogue, law, consensus, or voting, and that political differences should not turn into enmity that disrupts the work of the institution.

Knowledge of the political system means that a council member should be aware of how political institutions operate, the powers of the legislative council, and its relationship with the executive authority, and should be familiar with the Palestinian Basic Law and the legislation that defines its powers, responsibilities, and role in legislation, oversight, and accountability. A council member cannot effectively perform their role if they do not know the limits of their powers, the legal and constitutional tools available to them, and the responsibilities imposed by their position.

This can be summarized in three questions that we should ask any candidate: What do they know? What can they do? And do they have the will and independence to do it?

A member may possess knowledge but lack independence, or they may be independent yet lack experience, or they may have both but lack the will to confront personal or partisan interests. Herein lies the difference between someone who wants the seat and someone who wants the role.

This leads to another fundamental issue: the upcoming legislative council must not be a hostage to the executive authority; its function is not to automatically endorse government decisions, nor is it to obstruct the government merely for the sake of opposition. According to the Palestinian Basic Law, the council exercises legislative and oversight functions, and it has tools that include questions, interrogations, budget discussions, and confidence procedures for the government and ministers. Therefore, its independence is not an antagonism with the executive authority, but rather a condition of the institutional system.

An independent council is not a council against the government, but a council that is not afraid to monitor it; it supports when it sees that the policy serves the public interest, objects when it sees a flaw, asks when it needs information, and holds accountable when there is negligence.

However, even the best council will not operate in a normal environment. The Palestinian economy operates under a set of economic, political, and institutional constraints, including the clearance funds crisis, the decline in Palestinian workers' access to the Israeli labor market, restrictions on movement, trade, and crossings, as well as liquidity issues and banking relations. According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), a survey conducted at the end of 2025 documented the existence of 925 movement restrictions in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, which permanently or intermittently restrict the movement of approximately 3.4 million Palestinians.

Israel claims that part of these restrictions is related to security considerations and preventing attacks, while international entities simultaneously document the tangible economic and humanitarian impacts of these restrictions on access to work, education, health, markets, and land. Objectivity here does not mean placing the justification and the impact on the same scale, but rather distinguishing between the reason announced by the entity imposing the measure and the results that the measure leaves on people's lives.

The same applies to settler violence. The OCHA office reported in its September 2026 report that it documented more than 1,600 attacks by settlers resulting in Palestinian injuries or property damage in 275 Palestinian communities during the first eight months of the year. From the perspective of a citizen who sees armed individuals entering land, attacking property, or restricting access to agricultural land, some scenes may seem closer to cowboy movies, with a feeling that deterrence, protection, and accountability are not sufficient. However, accuracy requires that we do not generalize this to every incident or all settlers; the issue that can be documented is the recurrence of the phenomenon and its expanding impact on security, agriculture, movement, and livelihoods.

The upcoming Palestinian legislative elections gain an additional dimension due to their timing. The Israeli Knesset elections are scheduled for October 27, 2026, while the Palestinian legislative elections are set for November 28, 2026; a difference of nearly a month. Of course, there is no legal relationship between the two electoral processes, but there is a political and field relationship that is difficult to ignore. The composition of the Israeli government that will be formed after the elections and the policies it will adopt can affect the environment in which the Palestinian council will operate, from settlement, movement, clearance funds, labor, crossings, and Gaza to the prospects of the political path.

Here, a council member should not merely become an observer of what is happening in Israel, but rather a representative capable of translating any external change into practical Palestinian questions: What is its impact on us? What can the Palestinian government do? What alternatives are available if options become limited? What needs to be reformed internally regardless of the government in Israel? The Palestinian council does not choose the Israeli government, but it is responsible for holding the Palestinian government accountable for how it deals with its policies and their effects.

Here, the work of the council must be governed by a clear principle: not all problems are internal, and not all are external. It is not correct to hold Palestinian institutions responsible for constraints they do not control, nor is it permissible to use those constraints to justify every internal shortcoming.

No one prevents Palestinians from improving public financial management, increasing transparency, selecting competencies, combating corruption, enhancing services, or strengthening accountability. However, at the same time, the capacity of Palestinian institutions cannot be separated from the broader environment in which they operate. The economy is not only determined by the size of available resources but also by the ability of money, labor, goods, and institutions to move within the economic cycle. When restrictions accumulate on movement, work, trade, liquidity, transfers, and institutions, their effects may transfer from public finances and the banking sector to companies and the labor market, and then to household income, consumption, investment, and future opportunities.

This does not mean that every political constraint automatically leads to a specific economic outcome, but it means that the accumulation of constraints may narrow the margin of options available to the government, the private sector, and citizens at the same time. Here, the council's task becomes more realistic: it may not be able to remove a barrier, guarantee the transfer of clearance funds, or return all workers to the Israeli labor market, but it can ask the government: What is our plan? Are there alternatives? Are limited resources being used efficiently? How do we support the private sector? And how do we protect the families, youth, and workers most affected?

The council will also face the reality of Gaza and the extensive destruction it has suffered, a reality that requires not only rebuilding buildings and infrastructure but also rebuilding the economy, services, institutions, job opportunities, and trust. Hence, national unity, which was ranked second among the priorities of participants in the PCPO survey, becomes a practical issue rather than just a slogan.

This brings us back to the parties and factions. The differences among them are legitimate and natural, but the problem begins when the same discussions revolve year after year around reconciliation, government, representation, and the division of responsibilities, while the reality on the ground changes faster than the political system can respond. Political parties may differ on major political issues, but should this disagreement prevent an agreement on protecting public funds, improving education and health, combating corruption, supporting the private sector, and rebuilding Gaza?

What is required is not the elimination of differences, but rather that the differences do not become greater than the public interest, and that we move from competition over slogans to competition over programs, efficiency, and the ability to implement.

There is a significant responsibility on the parties and lists before it falls on the voter, because the voter does not choose from all members of society, but from among the names that those forces decide to present to him. Therefore, the quality of the council begins before the ballot box.

The message to the leaders of the lists is clear: do not choose only those who can win; choose those who can work after winning. Choose those who understand the law, the economy, and the budget, and who can hold a government close to their party accountable, listen to their political opponent, and work with them when the public interest requires it, and who can place the interests of the nation and the citizen above personal and partisan gain.

Before all of that, all these expectations are worthless if the elections themselves are not free, fair, and trustworthy. Legitimacy does not arise merely from the existence of a ballot box, but from the citizen's trust that their vote was counted as cast, that the competition was fair, and that oversight, appeals, and procedures were conducted according to clear rules. According to the Palestinian Central Elections Commission, the recent amendments have restored the number of members of the Legislative Council to 132, with representation for women of no less than 33% in the lists, a threshold of 1%, and the age for candidacy reduced to 23 years.

Thus, the council we need does not suffice with one type of legitimacy, but requires the legitimacy of the ballot, the legitimacy of representation, the legitimacy of competence, and then the legitimacy of achievement.

In the end, perhaps the question is not only: what are the specifications of the next member of the Legislative Council? But also: do we need a new political culture surrounding it?

A culture that combines representation and efficiency, legitimacy and independence, difference and the public interest, and realism in understanding constraints and courage in reforming what is within our capacity. Elections grant legitimacy, but they do not automatically confer achievement. Representation gives a voice, but it does not guarantee capability. Efficiency provides capability, but it requires independence, integrity, and will.

However, if the names change while the political culture remains the same, if the council remains subordinate, and if narrow interests continue to take precedence over the public interest, then we may have renewed faces without renewing politics.

Therefore, the final message is directed to everyone: to the voter who will choose, to the parties and lists that will decide whom to present, to those who will win membership in the council, to the executive authority that is supposed to be subject to oversight, and to the society that will hold everyone accountable.

Let us be realistic in understanding what is imposed upon us, honest in acknowledging what we can change, fair in distributing responsibilities, and more willing to place the interest of the nation and the citizen above personal and partisan interests.

Palestinians do not only need a new legislative council, but also an institution that knows why it was elected, for whom it works, whom it monitors, what it can change, when difference is a right, and when the public interest becomes greater than the difference itself.