End of the military option

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The problem of illegal weapons goes beyond maintaining the decision on war and peace to practically canceling legitimacy itself. Nothing is more dangerous than the use of weapons against the will of the official and popular majority except the project it serves, and for this purpose the Islamic Republic of Iran established a group of armed factions outside its borders within what it called the “Axis of Resistance.” What is required to protect the project and its arms is the “removal of Israel,” which Imam Khomeini saw as a “cancerous gland,” and the expulsion of America and all Western influence from West Asia. What is needed to implement the project is to ultimately control Arab geography and thus extend it from Iran to the Arab countries at the expense of the majority of their people. In both cases, it is an impossible task, regardless of some achievement in the beginning. The change in Damascus cut the Syrian bridge to the project. The war in Gaza, Lebanon, Iran, and Yemen put the four capitals that Tehran was proud to rule in a critical and difficult position.

The time has come to raise matters in essence, after years of pausing in the face of questions posed in a way that closes the door to discussion and imposes an answer. The issue is not whether or not there is resistance. It is no longer within the framework of the call for resistance to the Israeli occupation to have a comprehensive national structure, instead of being limited to a sectarian ideological party linked to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. The issue is that Lebanon does not have a military option. No to Hezbollah's weapons and its Iranian reference. Not to mention the legitimate weapon within the framework of the national security strategy, which was and still is a slogan put forward by some out of the conviction of others to cover the role of illegal weapons.

This is because the “Islamic Resistance” built its capital on liberating the south in 2000, and then worked to employ the balance in internal control over the levers of power, as well as in regional roles, including fighting to protect the Assad regime in Syria, and waging wars to support Gaza and Iran at the expense of the south, its people, and Lebanon. The Gaza support war was started by Hezbollah the day after Operation Al-Aqsa Flood at the hands of Hamas, and there was no occupation in Lebanon to resist, so it became the occupation. The war to support Iran led to Israel expanding the occupation all the way to the Litani and beyond.

What is currently absent is resistance to the brutal occupation that destroyed landmarks of villages in the south, under the pretext of adhering to the ceasefire declared by Washington and Tehran in the war on Iran and the southern front, of which it is a part. The present is “resistance” to the decisions of legitimacy, and the insistence on arming itself in preparation for another round of war when Iran requests it. They tell you about reconstruction and the storm is coming.

In other words, since the year 2000 we have been in resistance without occupation, and today we are under occupation without resistance. What is the need for a resistance that is incapable of protecting itself, its environment, and Lebanon, as well as preventing the occupation from expanding? What does it mean for a war waged by Hezbollah, not for the sake of Lebanon, but for the sake of Gaza and Iran at the expense of Lebanon? What kind of resistance is this, which militarizes a sect and isolates it from the rest of the sects, and accuses the state and the majority of the Lebanese of hostility and conspiring with America, Israel, and Saudi Arabia against “the resistance and its people”?

Something suggests today that the exaggeration of clashes, bombings, and civil war has begun to lose its effect. The state was not incapable of implementing its decisions as much as it was reluctant, as if it were a front of resistance. It appears to be on the verge of moving from the position of the helpless and the unwilling to the position of the capable. The exam is live. In the past, Al-Nafri said: “Risk is part of survival.”