Iran... Mojtaba and Coleridge's advice

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Since last February, following the killing of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, the fundamental question that has been preoccupying those who follow Iranian affairs has been: Was his son and successor Mojtaba killed alongside him, or is he still alive - or almost alive - to take over the reins of leadership?

At first, almost everyone thought he had been killed, as it was strange that he was the only survivor - and largely unscathed - of an attack that targeted his father's house, killing everyone in it. His disappearance without a trace for several days reinforced this belief.

After that, things changed; Either because it turns out that the man is actually alive, or because one of the talented screenwriters in Iran wrote a genius scenario about the elder Khamenei being retired and the young Khamenei replacing him. As a result, the following slogan appeared on thousands of billboards and walls across Iran: “Khamenei is back young!”

The screenwriter added a new twist; Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian announced that he had communicated with the new “guide.” It is worth noting here that the word “communication” can be interpreted in multiple forms: starting from a direct meeting, or through video or telephone communication applications... all the way to carrier pigeons, or through soul preparation sessions!

Once enough people had yielded to the poet Coleridge's advice to postpone doubts to enjoy a novel, we were told that the new guide gave Pezeshkian a personal reception, followed by another reception for Brigadier General Ali Abdullah, who had, for a long time, managed the Economic and Commercial Complex of the Revolutionary Guards.

Meanwhile, the media continued to broadcast statements attributed to Mujtaba, to keep this narrative alive. However, a question now arises: Are we witnessing a new turn in this novel? In fact, there are recent facts that indicate the positive.

Initially, we were told that the President of the Republic had appointed a new Minister of Defense - a decision that had always been the preserve of the “Supreme Leader,” for at least three decades. What is noteworthy is that the new minister, Mehrdad Akhlaqi, is not a professional military man, but rather a bureaucrat who ran the military manufacturing wing of the Revolutionary Guards.

Another unusual shift was Pezeshkian’s nomination of Brigadier General Majid Amin Reda as a military advisor to the presidency - a new position that indicates a major change from the established routine, in which the president communicated with the military establishment through the office of the Supreme Leader, known as the “House of the Guide.”

Another remarkable step was the announcement by the Commander-in-Chief of the Revolutionary Guard, Major General Ahmed Wahidi, that the paramilitary forces would “coordinate” their activities with the regular army through the Ministry of Defense, in another violation of “Al-Bayt.”

At the same time, an announcement was issued granting the regular army control over the Iranian coast of the Strait of Hormuz, while the Revolutionary Guards controlled the Omani side. The army was also assigned the responsibility of managing Iran's turbulent border with Pakistan, which extends 905 kilometers, in addition to its control of the Afghan border.

This arrangement gives the Revolutionary Guard the possibility of strengthening its presence on the border with Iraq, which may be threatened by armed groups supported by the United States or Israel.

Perhaps more importantly, what was stated by the Chief of Staff, Major General Abdullahi, is that senior commanders in the Revolutionary Guard and the regular army will from now on hold joint chiefs of staff meetings, again outside the system run by the “House of the Guide,” which required the presence of the “Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces” - that is, the Guide - in such meetings.

These developments revived talk about integrating the Revolutionary Guard into the regular army. This is an idea that was proposed during the presidency of Mohammad Khatami, but the late Khamenei strongly rejected it. Major General Mustafa Izdi - who was recently appointed deputy commander of the Revolutionary Guards - was one of the architects of this controversial scheme.

Outside the military, state-controlled media promoted claims that a “coordination committee,” including the president and five other senior figures—never clearly identified—would take all “important decisions.” This effectively canceled the order of the late Khamenei, which stipulated that the heads of the three authorities (executive, legislative, and judicial) assume that task, and submit their joint decisions to him for his final approval.

Changing this formula without the slightest sign of approval from Mujtaba may be further evidence that he does not really exist, or that he does not exercise authority in the way his father did.

Today, it is too early to say whether Iran is truly preparing to change course, at least with regard to its decision-making mechanism. If Iran survives the current war, it may transform into a military-security regime similar to what prevails in so-called Third World countries.

The power struggle in Tehran has not yet reached its decisive stage; The head of the Islamic Consultative Assembly (parliament), Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf - a retired brigadier general who fancied himself Donald Trump's favorite interlocutor in Tehran - challenged Pezeshkian's decisions, claiming that the "final decisions" belong to the Supreme Council for National Security. However, after losing many of its members as a result of “directed assassinations” by the Israelis, this council has become a truncated entity, while its new Secretary-General, retired Revolutionary Guard commander Mohsen Rezaei, remains a hostage to his childish delusions.

Whether Mojtaba appears or not, the fact remains that the regime has lost what little legitimacy it may have retained in the eyes of some, and is now ripe for change at the hands of the Iranian people.

My assessment is that Mojtaba either does not exist at all, or he is unable to play a decisive role in the power struggle taking place today in Tehran. Of course, he may surprise us and reappear to declare the “total victory” he promised in the war against the “Great Satan.” However, this, of course, requires a generous dose of adherence to Coleridge's advice.

Quoted from Asharq Al-Awsat