Iranian priorities between ideological commitment and conditions for survival

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What the positions issued by Iranian officials concerned with the file of negotiations with the United States of America, especially the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, Mohsen Rezaei, or the Speaker of Parliament and head of the negotiating delegation, Mohammad Baqir Ghalibaf, reveal is that the mediation efforts made by Russia through its Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, and Pakistan through the Army Commander, General Asem Munir, who visited Tehran respectively in recent days, revolve around trying to convince Tehran to agree to a settlement that resembles a concession, in what Regarding the issue of its stock of uranium enriched to a degree of 60 percent.

The high ceiling that Rezaei adhered to during his meeting with Munir, and his assertion that his country refuses to release a single iota of this stock, leads to believe that Lavrov has heard a similar position, and that the distance to reach a middle point between the Iranian and American positions is still wide, and it may be difficult to fill or bridge it in the remaining period of the midterm elections, and the possibility that US President Donald Trump’s threat to launch a fatal strike against Iran after the elections will come into effect.

It may be possible to consider Mounir's visit as the last opportunity before reaching a dead end, and the options for agreement receding in favor of the option of confrontation and escalation, and Lavrov's visit does not deviate from this description, given the positions and dimensions it carries that are related to the possibilities of war, the exits of a possible solution, and the role that Moscow may play at this delicate and critical time.

In light of these developments, Iranian internal positions began to witness a clear division, between hard-line positions adhering to the option of not making any concession, or concluding a settlement in which Tehran abandons some of its conditions and red lines, and positions calling for a kind of rationality, consideration of history, and realism in dealing with files that cause many losses, crises, and conflicts for Iran over the past decades. These positions are issued by parties that cannot be considered unconcerned with Iran’s future and its national and regional interests, especially since they It considered itself, and still is, largely and fundamentally involved in the search for ways out and solutions that would distance the bitter cup of war from Iran, its people, its interests, the stability of its regime, and the integrity of its lands.

Although these parties have no choice but to raise their voices in the face of their inability to influence crucial and strategic decisions, in reality they constitute a clear expression of the depth of the debate existing within the Iranian scene, and each party’s view of the course of developments, their repercussions, and the fears resulting from any decision or step, which may return Iran to the cycle of war.

In this context, it is possible to stop at the statements and positions made by former Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, in which he talked about the necessity of making painful concessions, in order to preserve Iran’s survival, and remove its existence and continuity from the circle of danger, and recall the “Turkmenchay Treaty” between Iran and Tsarist Russia, which the Qajar state signed about two centuries ago, after Russian forces arrived at the gates of Tehran, and in which they abandoned parts of historical Iran in the South Caucasus, and its goal was to preserve Iran and not abandoning parts of it, or losing parts in exchange for preserving the rest of the body, cohesive and unified.

Zarif’s words, despite his historically negative stance on the Russian role in the Iranian nuclear crisis, and his internal accusation by the “conservative” movement of having Western tendencies, and preferring to turn towards the West at the expense of the East, intersect in some way with suggestions that Lavrov and Munir may have had during their visit to Tehran, especially in his reference to the necessity of making difficult decisions and abandoning some things for the sake of the ultimate goal of the survival of Iran and its regime, and removing the specter of danger from the country and its survival.

Despite the military authorities concerned with the confrontation with the United States confirming and declaring their readiness for a broad and major response against any attack that might target Iran’s infrastructure, economics, and oil, the political level concerned with negotiation and dialogue with Washington and the international community is striving to find a fair equation for any possible and possible settlement with the American administration that removes the specter of the coming war and blocks the escalation of the negative effects of the sanctions and economic blockade imposed by Washington.

The indicators of a possible settlement, or a way out that guarantees Iran the fulfillment of part of its demands, and gives the US President the achievement he is looking for, started with the positions of Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian on the sidelines of his visit to the United Nations last September, and his words about Iran’s readiness to deal positively with the enriched uranium crisis, which is the solution that Russian President Vladimir Putin had previously proposed, in which he affirmed his country’s readiness to host this stockpile, as an entry point to revive the Iranian-American dialogue and negotiation, and keep the region away from the cycle of open war with its international repercussions.

Based on these indicators, it is possible to link between Zarif’s words about difficult concessions in order to continue, and the visit of Lavrov and Mounir, and the possibility that the goal is to activate the proposal to transfer the uranium stock to Russia, within mechanisms that can be agreed upon bilaterally or in conjunction with Washington, and that this step may help defuse the war that the American president is threatening, that is, accelerating the transition to the second phase of the nuclear file, from the roadmap that Zarif previously spoke about, and which was approved by the mechanisms of the memorandum of understanding between the two parties in Islam. Abad.

If the nuclear file represents an existential challenge and a credibility crisis for the decision-making system in the Iranian regime, and that any concession on it opens the way to a wide path of concessions, then an old debate that was taking place behind the scenes has returned to the fore, about the mechanism for dealing with and dealing with the Iranian issue with the Palestinian issue, and that part of the reformist political forces in particular, view this file as one of the causes and aspects of the conflict with the United States, especially since the regime’s ideological position clearly declares its hostility to Israel, and adopts any resistance project against it, and therefore continuing to adopt this The strategy, to be "more Tsarist than the Tsar", is bringing on Iran a lot of damage, losses and consequences, without any clear vision of the future of this hostility and its dimensions.

These voices would not have declared their position with such clarity during this stage, had it not been for the wars that took place in the Middle East, and the losses that Iran suffered as a result of the joint Israeli-American attacks, which were unprecedented in the history of the conflict between them. Therefore, they call on the leadership of the regime to reconsider this strategy and these policies, to save Iran and remove it from the circle of danger and threat.

Quoted from Independent Arabia